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Abstract 
  Middle management and their contribution to organizational performance has been a continuous 
topic in management studies over the past years. Middle managers have an influential position in 
the middle of the organization, affecting both workforce and top management decision-making 
processes. The position of middle managers has been studied in different industries and types of 
organizations. In this study, middle managers’ experiences are studied in the context of nuclear 
safety management. Safety management is a central issue in the nuclear business, and a concept of 
safety culture has been developed in the industry to address the importance of organizational as-
pects to the safety of a nuclear power plant. ”A good safety culture” is an objective required from 
the nuclear power organizations by the regulatory bodies, and the concept of safety culture has 
been studied widely in the field of high-risk organizations. In addition to defining the term safety 
culture, many studies have also focused on developing measurement criterions for the state of 
safety culture.  
In this thesis, middle managers’ experience of enhancing safety culture in Finnish nuclear power 
plants is investigated in a qualitative study. The empirical study consists of 12 middle manager 
interviews from the operating nuclear power plants in Finland. The objective of the study is to in-
vestigate how middle managers understand the concept of safety culture, how they experience 
their own position in safety culture enhancement and how they experience methods to enhance 
safety culture. The thesis is an explorative study and complements previous research by examining 
the phenomenon of safety culture from a perspective of managerial experience. The middle man-
agers’ experiences are analyzed with the regulations and safety culture policies of the nuclear pow-
er organizations. 
The main findings of the study show that the concept of safety culture is used extensively on the 
strategic level of the power companies but the lower organizational levels find the abstract term 
hard to define. Middle managers experienced a lack of common understanding of the meaning of 
the term. The interviewees gave numerous examples of the methods they use to enhance safety in 
their work practices but hesitated to call it safety culture enhancement. Furthermore, the middle 
managers experienced that safety culture enhancement was embedded in all practices and was   
everyone’s responsibility, instead of stating it as managerial responsibility to be enhanced. The 
study concludes that the safety culture enhancement is embedded in work practices in Finnish 
nuclear power plants but also reveals a need for future development to increase managers’ aware-
ness and abilities to enhance safety culture systematically. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In management studies, middle managers’ strategic contribution has been highlighted 
by many researchers (Currie & Procter, 2005). Although research questions have varied 
widely, many studies share the statement that middle managers have fundamental role 
in explaining organizational outcomes (Wooldridge et al., 2008). Middle managers’ 
contribution has been acknowledged to be an essential factor of organizational 
performance, as their intermediate position in the organization connects policies and 
strategies into work practices (Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000). 
 
Nuclear industry is a challenging environment and a fruitful context to a management 
study. Organizational factors that affect nuclear safety have been acknowledged widely 
in the past decades. Accidents have been noted to be caused by separate events that are 
linked together (Weick, 1990). Nuclear industry is highly regulated and good safety 
culture is one of the aspects required from the licensee organizations, the nuclear power 
companies who hold the official license to operate. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) launched the term “safety culture” to nuclear industry after the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. IAEA accident investigation report stated that the 
lack of safety culture was one component of the accident (INSAG, 1986). Since the 
term has been acknowledged, many accident investigations have cited lack of safety 
culture as a contributor of accidents in high-risk industries (Morrow et al., 2014). The 
phenomenon has been studied widely in the industry since the term was established in 
the 1980s and researchers have discussed the meaning and measuring aspects of the 
phenomenon continuously. 
 
Safety culture is acknowledged to be an essential element of nuclear safety. Good safety 
culture is expected from nuclear power plants by various formal bodies (Oedewald et 
al., 2015) on national and international levels. As organizational culture is a unique 
construction, the guiding instructions are general in nature. Licensee organizations are 
responsible for applying safety culture requirements in practice and developing 
strategies to increase good safety culture in nuclear power plants. After a licensee has 
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determined its own principles on how to maintain and develop safety culture on a 
strategic level, the task to embody good safety culture on an operational level lies on the 
shoulders of middle managers, as they are in charge of the operations. The role of 
middle managers is complex, as they work in between organizational policies and shop-
floor workforce (Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000).  
 
The study of the use of the term safety culture is important because the term is widely 
used in the industry but its nature is very abstract. The term has been used widely to 
emphasize the essential need for good safety culture but the meaning of the 
phenomenon can be understood in multiple ways. In different ends of the spectrum, 
some practitioner engineers see safety culture as a mechanic need to ensure employees’ 
attempt to follow orders, whereas scholars talk about safety culture as values and 
artifacts that lead the actions. 
 
In this thesis, perceptions of enhancing safety culture are studied from middle 
managers’ perspective. Organizational factors that affect nuclear safety have been 
widely acknowledged in the field of safety science but the leadership role has been 
studied hardly at all (Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2013). The managerial approach of this 
study complements the previous research of the field well.  
 
1.1. RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS  
 
The focus of this study is on safety culture in high-risk organizations and especially in 
nuclear power plants. The definition of the term has no universal agreement (Clarke, 
2000) but many studies have discussed the concept and factors of safety culture in the 
context of nuclear industry (Oedewald et al., 2015). Researchers have created theories 
and assessment criterions for safety culture evaluation, and the phenomenon and 
development methods have been widely discussed. Even though the need for good 
safety culture has been acknowledged and its meaning has been studied, Fukushima 
Daiichi accident in 2011 showed once again that further understanding of safety culture 
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still needs to be developed. The accident underlined the importance of different actors’ 
role in the ensemble (Oedewald et al., 2015). 
 
The complexity of middle managers’ role offers a great environment for this study. In 
the beginning of the research process, the overall framework was to research safety 
management and the study was narrowed down to safety culture development in Finnish 
nuclear power plants. The research will help Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority STUK to improve understanding of how safety management takes place in 
nuclear power plants, and the study signifies the meaningfulness of safety culture 
regulations. 
 
This master’s thesis complements previous literature by studying how middle managers 
experience their role in enhancing safety culture in Finnish nuclear power plants. The 
complexity of middle managers’ role offers a great environment for this study as it 
indicates (1) how middle managers understand the concept of safety culture, (2) how 
they experience their own position in safety culture enhancement and (3) how they 
experience methods to enhance safety culture. 
  
The research questions are: 
How middle managers understand the concept of safety culture? 
How middle managers experience their own position in safety culture enhancement? 
How middle managers experience methods to enhance safety culture? 
 
1.2. KEY CONCEPTS 
 
There are some concepts in this study that need to be discussed before entering deeper 
into the academic and empirical research of the phenomenon of managing safety in 
nuclear industry from the middle managers’ perspective. Many terms used in this study 
lack universal agreement in their definition, and therefore it is essential to understand 
how this study interprets the key concepts used through the investigation. The terms 
introduced in this section are central in understanding the topic of this thesis. 
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Middle managers 
A manager is a person who is responsible for employees in the specific function and/or 
for the performance of the function. Many scholars define middle manager from the 
vertical axle of an organization chart (Wooldridge et al., 2008). Therefore, middle 
managers would be the ones who are in the middle of the organization chart. Some 
scholars have argued that middle managers should have at least two hierarchical levels 
under them (Staehle & Schirmer, 1992). Curries & Procter (2005) has studied middle 
managers focusing on the professionals who work in contact with operations and limited 
administrative middle managers out of the focus. In this study middle managers are seen 
as the persons whose position in the organization touches both shop-floor employees 
and administrative work. Therefore, middle managers of this study are comparatively 
low in the vertical organization charts, because this study investigates the managerial 
attempts to enhance safety on the operational level.  
 
Safety 
Another term that is easy to bypass without closer consideration is the concept of safety. 
Safety is something that we all understand but an abstract phenomenon that is hard to 
define explicitly. Safety is an outcome of valued performance and it is easily forgotten 
unless safety problems actually occur (Reason, 1998). Safety does not come as a 
benefit, but it has to be built inside practices (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). This study 
examines industry where safety is the most critical element of the whole operation, and 
therefore, safety is an essential concern of the research. Safety in this study is seen as a 
phenomenon that ensures safe outcome of the operations by ensuring safe operations by 
high-quality preparation. 
 
Safety culture 
In this study safety culture is understood as the part of organizational culture which 
affects safety. The concepts of organizational culture and organizational climate were 
largely under discussion in academia in the 1970s and 1980s (Guldenmund, 2000), and 
the difference between these two has already in the 1980s been described to be that 
climate research has a much more quantitative focus while culture research tends to 
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focus on qualitative methods (Glick, 1985). To define the difference between these two 
concepts, Guldenmund (2000) stated that culture is the underlying processes and the 
term climate means the manifestation of organizational culture. The term safety culture 
is used as a concept to analyze organizational behavior concerning safety-related issues, 
and therefore, it is an aspect of the organizational culture. It is essential to recognize that 
in this thesis safety culture is viewed specifically from a perspective of nuclear safety, 
and therefore, other important factors of safety culture, like security issues and 
occupational safety where culture is also a critical aspect, are not in the main focus of 
the study. 
 
Organizational culture 
The understanding of organizational culture in this study is based on the work of Edgar 
Schein (1985). He defines culture as an organic phenomenon that is created and 
constantly developed in interaction. Culture sets the rules of how people are supposed to 
behave and feel in interactive situations and therefore sets the social order of behavior 
(Schein, 2004). The interpretive perspective to organizational culture (Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000) is adopted to enable studying safety culture as a phenomenon that is built 
in interaction of individuals.   
 
With these small concept clarifications, the environment of this thesis study can be 
understood and the content followed through the investigation. These key concepts are 
defined in a deeper manner during the academic and empirical research phases of the 
study. Therefore, these concept clarifications work only as guidelines for the reader to 
develop understanding of managerial experiences of enhancing safety culture in Finnish 
nuclear power plants. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This thesis is a qualitative study using interviews as primary empirical data and 
documentation as secondary data. As the importance of safety culture has been widely 
acknowledged in nuclear industry, an investigation shall be conducted to find out how 
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the term has been defined in academia as well as by practitioners and in what 
connections the term safety culture is used in the industry. This thesis will gather 
different definitions together and construct a coherent entirety of the use of the term. 
The focus of the study is on the Finnish nuclear industry and requirements that concern 
Finnish nuclear power plants. The investigation of the material concerning safety 
culture is limited to the use of the term safety culture.  
 
As the official documents are layered together as an umbrella that determines how 
safety culture shall occur, it is essential to understand what actually has been said of the 
meaning of the term and how different parties understand its meaning. By 
systematically studying the documents emphasizing the objective of safety culture 
together with studying the managerial views to the phenomenon, this thesis will 
introduce an overall picture of the phenomenon in the Finnish nuclear industry. 
 
The definition and documental sensemaking of the term safety culture are reflected on 
middle managers’ experiences of safety culture, which are based on and planned to 
support the official requirements. This thesis is intended to determine how middle 
managers experience their role in turning safety culture into practice. Effectiveness of 
interventions aiming to improve safety performance have been rarely studied (Hale et 
al., 2010), and in this study middle managers’ experiences about what they see as 
effective methods to improve safety culture in nuclear power plants will be emphasized. 
This study is important because middle managers’ role is fundamental in the overall 
performance of an organization, and it has not been studied in the context of safety 
culture enhancement. 
 
The primary empirical material of this study consists of 12 interviews conducted in 
operating Finnish nuclear power plants. The interviewees were chosen for this study 
based on their position in between the organizational strategy and shop-floor workers. 
They were chosen from middle management of maintenance, operations and 
engineering functions of operating nuclear power plants to gather a coherent picture of 
middle managers’ perceptions of enhancing safety culture. 
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The study is limited to operating nuclear power plants in Finland. The limitation helps 
to construct an overall picture of the demanding position of middle management. 
Construction projects were left out of the scope because of their fundamentally different 
characteristics in managing safety and in building safety culture into their operations. 
Limiting the study into Finnish context helps us to focus on the safety-critical aspects of 
culture, while expanding the study into other countries and cultures would complicate 
the study radically by bringing in the different national cultures, as well. In the Finnish 
context, the organizational culture varies but is based on similar assumptions of culture, 
whereas the context would change radically if the companies included in the study 
would come from very different countries and cultures. 
 
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The structure of this thesis follows common guidelines for an academic research paper. 
The thesis consists of literature research as well as empirical research of the 
phenomenon. In the following chapters, the study carries the reader from academic 
knowledge to the empirical study, justifying the research on its way. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces academic literature that concerns the concepts under investigation. 
Literature review starts with middle manager studies, as they are the center of the 
research. Middle manager studies in general are introduced for building a coherent 
background, and after that, middle managers’ connection to safety is discussed. After 
the managerial approach of the literature review, safety & culture studies are introduced. 
The second section of the chapter presents academic discussion of the term culture and 
its abstract nature and explains how the term is understood in this study. Moreover, a 
basic overview of cultural studies is given and discussion of the development of the 
concept is summarized. In this thesis, cultural aspects are looked through the work of 
Edgar Schein (1985), and therefore, his views are presented in a subchapter of its own. 
After that, the debate of the concept of safety is introduced and the focus is on safety 
culture studies and the section tends to clarify the concept of safety culture in more 
detail. Both theoretical and empirical safety culture studies are introduced. Finally, 
 
 
8 
 
Chapter 2 ends by introducing a theoretical framework for the study where the different 
fields researching middle managers, safety aspects and culture are tied together as a 
conclusion of the literature review, and the framework of this thesis is introduced.  
 
Chapter 3 consists of the introduction to the empirical research approaches of the study. 
Research method and methodical decisions of the study are presented and validated in 
the chapter. The empirical research of this thesis consists of qualitative study of the use 
of the term safety culture in Finnish nuclear industry and middle manager interviews, 
which are conducted to investigate middle managers’ perceptions of safety culture and 
safety culture enhancement.  
 
Chapter 4 introduces the empirical findings of the study. The chapter starts with 
investigating safety culture regulations and requirements in the Finnish context and 
continues with the licensees’ safety culture statements. These are studied to understand 
the environment where the middle managers work, and the base and need for their 
interventions. After these, the middle manager interviews are analyzed. The findings are 
opened up and several quotes are expressed together with the analysis to emphasize the 
findings. The chapter ends by summarizing the findings together. 
 
Chapter 5 sums up the research as a conclusion chapter. The last chapter provides an 
overview to this master’s thesis and connects its different parts as a coherent ensemble. 
First, the main findings of the study are discussed. Furthermore, managerial 
implications are introduced to conclude the analysis. Nevertheless, suggestions for 
further research are discussed as a last part of the conclusion chapter. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework of the study is introduced. The chapter is 
divided into three sections to construct an overview to the academic literature and 
discussion of the themes of the study. Middle managers are the focus group of the 
investigation, and therefore, the chapter starts with an overview of middle manager 
studies. After that, the discussion over managerial attempts to enhance safety is 
presented.  
 
The second section of this chapter concentrates on explaining the concept of safety 
culture through examining (1) culture and especially organizational culture and (2) 
safety and safety culture. Culture has been studied in many disciplines and the abstract 
term needs to be discussed deeper before entering into the discussion of safety culture 
and the empirical research of this thesis. Culture studies are first introduced on a general 
level and after that, the focus is on Edgar Schein’s work, which has been selected to be 
the base of the understanding of culture in this thesis. This simplification has been 
made, because studying the concept of culture is not in the focus of the study and 
narrowing the understanding of the term helps us to focus on the safety-critical elements 
and managerial aspects of the phenomenon. 
 
As the context of the study is on nuclear industry, safety is one aspect of the 
investigation. After discussing the concept of safety, safety culture research is 
investigated. Safety culture has gained a lot of attention in safety studies and many 
researchers have studied safety culture also in the nuclear industry. 
 
Finally, this chapter of literature review ends by presenting the theoretical framework of 
the study. As the study is investigating a phenomenon of culture as a middle manager 
experience, the framework will collect all subheadings of middle managers, culture 
studies and safety. Connecting these elements together will provide a rich base for the 
study where managerial perspectives to enhancing safety culture are investigated. 
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2.1. MIDDLE MANAGERS 
 
Leaders and managers are in the central position in enhancing desired organizational 
culture and performance in every organization. Top management sets the goals for the 
performance and decides how the mission and vision will be achieved through the 
strategic plan. On the operational level, team leaders look after their employees and 
make sure that they are together working towards the desired direction. Team leaders 
have essential role in motivating employees in the shop-floor activities.  
 
Between top management and team leaders, most organizations have multiple levels of 
managers who work in the middle trying to translate organizational level policies into 
operational practices and vice versa (e.g. Rouleau & Balogun, 2011). Literally, the 
definition of middle management would indicate any of those professionals who work 
in managerial position in the middle of the organization in the vertical axis (Dutton & 
Ashford, 1993). Furthermore, middle managers’ position makes unique their access to 
both top management and operations (Wooldridge et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
definition of a middle manager could be based on the access to these stakeholders. In 
this study, middle managers are understood as the people who do not work primarily on 
the operational level but have clear connection to the employees, and therefore, work as 
the translators between organizational policies, purely administrative staff and shop-
floor operations. This definition, therefore, includes in the discussion both functional 
managers and line managers.  
 
In this section, an overview of middle manager studies is first introduced to develop an 
understanding of their essential position. Middle management research in management 
studies focuses on strategic issues, but those studies indicate also elements that are 
interesting from the point of view of this study, as safety is clearly one of the key 
elements that nuclear power companies value as a core strategic issue, as well. After the 
summarizing introduction to the middle manager studies, the next section focuses on 
previous research of managerial attempts to enhance safety. This section ties middle 
managers closer to the investigation of safety culture enhancement in safety critical 
organizations. 
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2.1.1 OVERVIEW OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
 
The number of middle managers increased fundamentally, as the industrialism 
developed. Currie & Procter (2005) call the phase from the 1900s to the 1970s as the 
golden age of middle managers. After the second World War, organizations started to 
get bigger, create more hierarchy, and therefore, middle managers where needed 
increasingly. The trend led eventually to a situation where productivity decreased as an 
outcome of an increased number of employees in administration functions (Cameron et 
al., 1991).  
 
The second phase of new competitive reality started from the 1980s as the outcome of 
deregulation and increasing global competition (Currie & Procter, 2005). Downsizing 
and restructuring organizational structures were used as a solution to cut costs (Balogun, 
2003). In this phase, the number of middle managers decreased as organizations tried to 
form effective functions by cutting all the slack from the hierarchy levels they had 
developed before the new price competitive environment (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; 
Stoker, 2006). Currie & Procter (2005) also recognize a third phase, where 
organizations have realized that lower hierarchies have not produced desired effective 
organizational performance. In addition, Floyd & Wooldridge (1997) discussed the 
destructible effects of organizations’ large-scale restructuring decisions. They state that 
the social network of an organization suffers fundamentally from de-layering activities, 
as middle managers have a central contribution to the social elements of an 
organization. 
 
Middle management and managers’ contribution to organizational performance have 
been studied particularly during the last 30 years (Wooldridge et al., 2008).  The 
importance of middle managers’ contribution to strategy gained attention as the strategy 
process started to interest researchers increasingly (Mantere, 2008). Before that, 
management was seen as a top-down process without deeper analysis of the processes 
between top management and organizational performance. Strategy making was seen as 
a top management performance still in the first phase of increasing the amount of 
middle managers.  
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Social learning perspective shifted the focus from top management into a perspective 
that recognizes multiple actors that affect the performance (Wooldridge et al., 2008). 
From this perspective, social learning is an essential element of strategy work and lower 
levels in the organization have a fundamental role in forming new leads and ideas. 
Scholars had argued about the importance of social and political factors before (Schilit, 
1987) but the work of Mintzberg (1978) is one of the popular early studies arguing that 
strategy formulation and implementation cannot be studied separately as they are deeply 
interlinked. That means not only the issues under discussion but also the people 
performing these tasks. Mintzberg (1978) discussed about emerging strategy, which 
refers to the strategic activities and performance rather than to the plans on paper. 
Middle managers and social aspects of the performance started to interest researchers 
and many of the early studies recognized the impact of middle managers on the strategy 
process (Burgelman 1983; Schilit, 1987). 
 
The activities and behaviors of mid-level professionals have been recognized as an 
important contribution to organizational performance during the past years. Wooldridge 
et al. (2008) conclude that the studies concerning middle managers’ role and influence 
are mostly developed through themes of corporate entrepreneurship, innovation and 
organizational learning, strategy implementation or strategy-making processes. The 
conclusion that middle managers are important factors of organizational performance 
have been shared in all these research areas. Moreover, Stoker (2006) introduces the 
“quality movement” where middle management studies have focused on new 
responsibilities of middle managers. These responsibilities include performance, 
measurement and efficiency on employee satisfaction and other “soft” objectives of the 
management. Middle managers’ competence in achieving these goals has been 
emphasized in these studies (Ellinger et al., 2003; Stoker, 2006). 
 
One of the key assets of middle managers is the social networks their position enables 
them to affect (Westley, 1990). Middle managers are able to influence other employees 
to adopt their point of view (Rouleau & Balogun, 2011), as they interact in several 
directions inside the organization. These influencing activities that middle managers 
pursue have been investigated in studies that focus on issue-selling (Dutton & Ashford, 
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1993; Dutton et al., 2001). They emphasize middle managers’ sensemaking and 
discursive perspective (Mantere & Vaara, 2008; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011) as well as 
their contribution to generate shared understanding (Hoon, 2007). Nonaka & Takeuchi 
(1995) described middle managers as the ones who create the knowledge in an 
organization, as they shift information from the middle to both top management and 
employees. 
 
Middle managers’ effect on the organizational performance has been studied mostly 
through strategy work where middle managers’ contribution to organizational 
performance is divided into developing better strategies by involving middle managers 
in decision making and into improving performance by middle management 
involvement by increasing consensus of the pursued strategic goals (Wooldridge & 
Floyd, 1990). Rouleau & Balogun (2011) use terms strategy formulation and strategy 
implementation to discuss these same states of middle manager involvement.  
Moreover, middle managers’ role in social interaction of strategy process has been 
studied and Mantere (2008) calls this a strategic agency. Wooldridge et al. (2008) 
conclude that studies from middle managers’ strategic perspective can be divided into 
three categories; strategic roles, involvement in strategy and middle managers’ strategic 
behavior and organizational outcomes.   
 
Middle managers as contributors to organizational strategy is a multi-dimensional scope 
as the results of their work cannot be measured as easily as top management’s efforts to 
increase organizational performance as a whole (Rouleau, 2005). Wooldridge et al. 
(2008) suggest that middle management research lacks cumulative research that is 
conducted from top management, because their efforts cannot be measured directly 
from the organizational performance. Research of middle managers’ contribution has 
been more focused on middle management involvement in strategy implementation 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994). Middle management research also explores more 
intermediate outcomes of organizational performance and performances of separate 
functions rather than the organization as a whole (Wooldridge et al., 2008). The primary 
purpose of their efforts might not be increased organizational performance as such, but a 
smaller focus area inside it (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). 
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To summarize the overview of middle management studies, contribution of middle 
managers’ efforts to the organizational performance is hard to measure. Effectiveness of 
their interventions towards improved performance is hard to define even though the 
importance of these elements in organizations are widely recognized. It is even more 
problematic to measure how middle managers’ contribution to safety can be recognized. 
In the next section, studies of middle managers’ efforts to enhance safety are discussed. 
These studies are rare but combining studies of middle management and managerial 
attempts to endorse safety provides the knowledge needed to discuss also middle 
managers’ possibilities to enhance safety. 
 
2.1.2 MANAGERIAL ATTEMPTS TO ENHANCE SAFETY  
 
The question of middle managers’ contribution to strategic performance has been the 
main approach of middle management research in management studies. Middle 
managers’ essential position has been discussed mainly by approaching the dilemma 
from a strategic viewpoint but the same ideas can also be configured by looking at 
middle managers’ contribution on enhancing safety, as safety is one of the critical 
strategic components of nuclear power companies. 
 
Leaders and managers have a crucial role in enhancing organizational culture and 
developing it to a safe direction. Organizational culture is fundamentally affected by 
leaders’ beliefs and manipulation (Schein, 2004) and middle managers’ perceptions are 
essential in enhancing the organizational culture towards a safe direction. On the other 
hand, middle managers are the ones who translate top management policies into 
operations, and their understanding of the meaning of safety culture determines how top 
management intends to develop safety culture and how it is actually translated into 
practices inside power plants. Their role is also essential in pushing forward the desired 
behavior and actions. 
 
McAllister (1995) asserts that employees’ trust in management affects critically their 
individual work performance. Managers’ abilities to enhance commitment to the 
organization will show as employees’ attempts to act responsibly as their confidence 
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and faith in their managers grow. Konovsky & Pugh (1994) studied employees’ 
attempts to perform above the expected and summed up that the managers’ 
interventions are in the central role in enhancing the organizational behavior that 
endorses acting beyond the call of duty. Essential elements in building this kind of over-
expected performance are the manager’s trust and justice as well as the quality of 
managerial relationship (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994). In management research, high wage 
rates (e.g. Bloom, 1999), participation in decision making (e.g. Mantere & Vaara, 2008) 
as well as training opportunities are often listed as means to enhance employee 
commitment. Research has shown that high-performance work practices are associated 
with organizational performance and financial outcomes and these efforts have impact 
on overall success (Huselid, 1995).  
 
Managers’ complex position and responsibility for the employees challenge the action 
of offering trust on employees’ activities. The importance of trust is easily undervalued 
and has also lacked systematic theoretical attention (McAllister, 1995). Trust in 
employees is especially challenging in high-risk industries where the slightest mistakes 
can lead to problems. Detailed instructions and monitoring operations prevent 
negligence mistakes, and even when trust would lead to superior performance, the cost 
of a human error can be extreme.  
 
Management practices that engender trust and commitment are essential in enhancing 
safety. Barling & Hutchinson (2000) investigated managers’ safety enhancing strategies 
and their effect on the performance of the employees. The study is conducted in the 
field of workplace safety, which is one of the components of the overall safety that this 
study is investigating.  Barling & Hutchinson (2000) studied the differences of control-
based safety principles versus commitment-based and evaluated how they affected 
employees’ safety practices and safety climate. Control-based safety principles mean 
the mandatory requirements and processes that are forced to be conducted in 
organizations. Control-based approaches can include rules and punishments together 
with rewards for achieving safety goals. These approaches are traditionally seen as 
effective ways to increase safety in organizations. Commitment-based approach to 
enhance safety is argued to be more effective than traditionally highly valued control-
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based methods (Barling & Hutchinson, 2000). Their results suggest that organizations 
may benefit from a commitment-based approach to enhance workplace safety. This 
result is not directly comparable to the safety-critical industries, but indicates the 
importance of commitment over control, which is important to acknowledge also in the 
nuclear industry. 
 
Safety management practices have been studied in safety-critical industries especially in 
quantitative researches. Mearns et al. (2003) studied offshore oil and gas installations 
and reflected employees’ safety climate survey results to a questionnaire of senior 
management’s safety management practices. Vinodkumar & Bhasi (2010) conducted a 
large survey among employees of eight major accident hazard process industrial units in 
India. Both of the studies stress the importance of safety management and coherent 
safety management system. Middle managers are not mentioned in the studies. Grote & 
Künzler (2000) studied employees’ perceptions regarding operational safety on different 
organizational levels and stated that most studies focus on assessing a formal safety 
management system instead of studying employees. They claim that qualitative study 
helps to gain a better understanding of safety management and safety culture together 
with the quantitative methods. Pilbeam et al. (2016) studied safety management and 
noted that many researchers use transformational-transactional scale to measure safety 
management with vague outcomes. They state that the results of different studies vary 
and other measurement scales should be found to evaluate safety management. 
  
Fruhen et al. (2013) studied senior managers’ influence on safety culture in air traffic 
management organizations, but studies of safety culture often focus on low-level 
workers (Silbey, 2009) and organizational, structured forces that influence it. Middle 
managers’ influential position is highly acknowledged in managerial studies, but their 
contribution in enhancing safety in high-risk industry lacks research. The importance of 
management is emphasized in various studies in safety science but studies which focus 
on managers or management practices are rare. Safety performance is hard to measure, 
as safety is the outcome of operations where nothing unexpected happens. Hale et al. 
(2009) studied effectiveness of safety management interventions and highlight the 
importance of management support on improving safety culture. Monitoring behavior 
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and hazards continuously are also in their study recognized as an essential element of 
safety culture.  In the next section, studies of culture and safety will be introduced to 
construct a better understanding of the research done in the field. 
 
2.2. SAFETY & CULTURE 
 
A range of meanings has been addressed to the term safety culture in academia 
(Glendon & Stanton, 2000) but still the definition of the term has no universal 
agreement (Clarke, 2000). The debate of the definition is similar to the discussion of the 
definition of organizational culture. Both of them are complex terms trying to explain a 
phenomenon that has several features. Even when it was defined that safety culture is 
the safety-critical part of organizational culture, the first interests towards safety culture 
did not rise from the theoretical base of organizational culture. Clarke (2000) stated that 
it is fair to suggest that these two concepts share many features, even when it is noted 
that the use of the term safety culture did not start from the base of organizational 
culture theories. 
 
Disagreement upon the definition of safety culture is primarily based on understanding 
of the term “culture”. Therefore, it is important to determine, how culture and especially 
organizational culture is understood in this study before going deeper into the 
phenomenon of safety culture. Some researchers determine it differently, but in this 
thesis, safety culture is understood as a part of organizational culture that affects safety. 
It means that safety culture is not an isolated phenomenon but a part of the bigger 
construction of organizational culture. Therefore, investigation of safety culture in this 
study starts with defining it first through organizational culture. 
 
2.2.1 OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE STUDIES 
 
Organizational culture is a concept that has been studied widely across different 
disciplines. The lack of an agreed definition and research from different perspectives 
 
 
18 
 
has determined various overlapping studies, which makes it hard to say whether they are 
discussing about the same phenomena (Frost et al., 1991). Researchers through decades 
have categorized organizational culture studies into new frameworks to explain the 
differences of the studies.  
 
Scholars have argued upon the nature of culture and some see culture as something that 
an organization is while others see culture as something that an organization has 
(Smircich, 1983; Reason, 1998). Both approaches are important, but have very different 
nature. Smircich (1983) describes the view of culture as something an organization is as 
a root metaphor for conceptualizing organizations. “Culture as something an 
organization is” approach promotes an understanding of expressive, ideational and 
symbolic aspects of organizations (Smircich, 1983) while “culture as something an 
organization has” approach refers to matters that are easier to manipulate (Reason, 
1998). 
 
To introduce a complex version of the studies determining scholars’ understanding of 
organizational culture, Meyerson & Martin (1987) suggested a framework where 
different views to understand organizational culture were categorized into three 
paradigms according to the perspective of the researcher. The paradigms’ integration, 
differentiation and ambiguity differ in terms of consensus that the members of the 
organization have towards the culture. Meyerson & Martin (1987) state that in 
organizational culture studies, the main difference in approach is whether the culture is 
studied as a shared consensus, subcultural consensus or inconsistent in nature. These 
examples show how other scholars look at the aspects that form the culture, whereas 
others focus on the human experiences of how the culture is understood. 
 
Most of the organizational culture studies use only one perspective to study the 
dilemma. Researchers easily focus on one aspect of the phenomena in their work. 
Meyerson & Martin (1987) argue that it would be essential to look at the organization 
from many perspectives to see the whole picture. The one-perspective studies are usual 
and not any less true but because of the narrow perspective on culture, they present only 
a part of the phenomena. It is very challenging to use a multi-approach method, as mind 
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is naturally focused more closely on some aspects and it is not easy to see the 
differences (Frost et al., 1991).  
 
As researchers have been trying to construct a clear definition of the meaning of 
organizational culture, different distinctions have been made. The 1970s and 1980s 
were decades of great discussion of organizational culture and organizational climate 
and many studies defining the phenomena can be found from that era (Guldenmund, 
2000). The terms organizational culture and organizational climate have overlapped and 
been brought together in many studies (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Organizational 
climate was widely in use in the 1970s but eventually culture replaced the term climate 
in the 1980s (Guldenmund, 2000).  
 
Where climate was particularly seen as the common characteristic of behavior, culture 
has been used for a bigger entity that takes into consideration also the background of 
values and beliefs. The difference between these two concepts has already in the 1980s 
been described to be that climate research has a much more quantitative focus, whereas 
culture research tends to focus on qualitative methods (Glick, 1985). To define the 
difference between these two concepts, Guldenmund (2000) stated “research on culture 
is much more focused on the dynamic processes at work in an organizational culture, 
continuously creating and shaping it” (p. 220).  
 
Bate (1984) described organizational culture as follows: “people in organizations evolve 
in their daily interactions with one another a system of shared perspectives or 
‘collectively held and sanctioned definitions of the situation’, which make up the culture 
of these organizations”. This definition works as a good solidification of the complex 
dilemma. Bate’s definition shares the understanding of culture as attitudes determining 
the actions and practices that affect others and therefore reform the culture in the 
organization. 
 
Another persistent debate in the 1980s was the levels of culture that can be found from 
an organization. Multiple researchers have framed different levels of culture when the 
theme boomed in the 1980s after the term culture got the expanded attention of 
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researchers. Many researchers have collected these studies together. Guldenmund 
(2000) collected these studies together to construct a coherent picture of the similarities 
of the studies. Different researchers framed the levels differently, but the core is 
constructed of values or basic underlying assumptions, which is the case in the work of 
Edgar Schein. His work is introduced in the following section. 
 
2.2.2 MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE BY EDGAR SCHEIN 
 
In this thesis, culture is understood through the work of Edgar Schein (1985, 2004).  He 
structures the concept of culture into four categories of which organizational culture is 
in the focus in this study. He states, that culture is a phenomenon which is shaped by 
individuals and their interaction. At the same time, culture sets the rules of how we are 
supposed to behave and feel in interactive situations and therefore sets the social order 
of behavior (Schein 2004). Schein (1985, p. 9) summarizes the meaning of culture to be 
“a pattern of basic assumptions that has worked well enough to be taught to new 
members as the current way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems”.  
 
The work of Edgar Schein has been highly valued by practitioners. In this study, the 
concept of culture is not in the focus of the research. Therefore, it is justified to (1) form 
an overall picture of the studies focused on culture through time but moreover to (2) 
focus on explaining the phenomena according to a scholar whose perspective is 
commonly recognized to form a base to the study that does not focus on the culture 
itself but on a small part of it. Therefore, the work of Schein is used here to determine 
how organizational culture is understood in this study. 
 
The base of the concept how Schein (1985) structures culture is through three levels of 
culture. Culture can be defined by using three main levels, which are artifacts (1), 
espoused beliefs and values (2) and underlying assumptions (3). By the levels, Schein 
means the degree of visibility that a cultural phenomenon has. These can be described 
as an iceberg where only artifacts are visual, and rest of the culture cannot be seen 
without closer examination. 
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Figure 1. The Three Levels of Culture (Edgar Schein, 2004) 
 
The model has been cited widely, and many studies have been based upon the work of 
Schein. What is important in this study is the base that safety culture as a part of 
organizational culture has different levels and aspects that affect the culture differently. 
Some parts of the culture are visible and known by the members of the culture or even 
visible to outsiders, but other ones are invisible and even unconscious. These embedded 
basic assumptions that are rooted behind all the visible signs of culture have to be taken 
into consideration, too. Schein (2004) calls these as the essence of culture. Observers 
easily measure only the artifacts that are visible to them and assume the underlying parts 
of the culture based on their own knowledge and experiences. This is an easy pitfall that 
happens commonly when humans evaluate cultures they are not part of. Schein (2004) 
writes that observers can see and feel the visible parts, but that alone does not reveal the 
meanings that those things signify to the members of the culture. 
 
The next level behind the visible part of artifacts in Schein’s model is espoused beliefs 
and values. These values and goals are constructed in social processes and transformed 
through time. These conscious beliefs and values predict most of the behavior that is 
visible in the level of artifacts (Schein, 2004). It is important to note that the beliefs and 
values of a culture can be claimed to be other that what they actually are. This can be 
seen in an organizational setting where values are stated to be greater than what the 
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actions reveal. This point is essential in the empirical research of this study as it 
indicates how to relate to the safety values that middle managers present in their 
interviews. 
 
The deepest level of culture, the basic underlying assumptions, are unconscious 
manners that are hard to measure. They determine behavior on a taken-for-granted level. 
The basic underlying assumptions are non-negotiable and therefore extremely hard to 
change (Schein, 2004). In the context of this study, safe operations are assumed to be a 
taken-for-granted commission of the organizational culture that employees are not ready 
to negotiate in any manner and the assumption will be reflected in the empirical 
findings.  
 
The development of organizational culture is highly influenced by the core mission and 
the main opinion leaders of the organization. Taking the role of an opinion leader is 
easiest for leaders and managers as their position already offers them power over other 
members. Schein (2004) states that originally leadership is the source of beliefs and 
values. Managers’ actions and perceptions lead the development of the organizational 
culture. These activities are essential as a new organization form, because the basic 
structure of the culture develops in the beginning. Leaders’ assumptions become easily 
shared assumptions of the culture.  
 
Schein (2004) states that organizational culture gets stable as the work environment 
matures and activates again as new aspects arise to the ensemble. It is essentially harder 
to change the shared values after an assumption is attached to the organizational culture. 
It is even harder to change the basic underlying assumptions. Managers’ role is 
fundamentally important in developing organizational culture into a desired direction 
one step at a time. 
 
As the operating nuclear power plants in Finland have been running for decades, the 
focus of this study is on developing matured cultures into desired direction by active 
leadership. Managers embed their beliefs, values and assumptions in their management 
practices, which are everything from what they notice and comment to the ways they 
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measure, reward and control their team (Schein, 2004). The studies have shown that 
development is still needed to ensure safe operations. The critical component is the 
awareness of the manager. His or her actions reform the culture more effectively than 
any others’, so they have to be aware of their critical role in the ensemble.  
 
2.2.3 DEFINING SAFETY CULTURE 
 
Before going deeper into safety culture studies, it is essential to understand why good 
safety culture is needed in nuclear industry. Nuclear industry holds high risks. Not only 
economical but also massive risks to the environment as a whole. Safety is an essential 
element that makes it possible to use nuclear power. Without extremely high safety 
levels, nuclear power could not be used because of the consequences that nuclear 
accidents would generate. In this kind of business, safety is the lifeline of the whole 
production.  
 
Safety is invisible, because safe performance does not capture attention (Reason, 1998). 
Problems occur when safety fails. The term safety has been used in different purposes, 
but the main insight of the term is to prevent unwanted consequences from happening. 
Gherardi & Nicolini (2002) state that safety is not something that could be just added to 
action, rather it has to be built into the practices. The difficulty is that building safety 
into practices demands heterogeneous implementing methods, as individual employees 
understand safety differently because of their cultural backgrounds (Gherardi & 
Nicolini, 2002). Individuals come with their earlier experiences and beliefs, and 
therefore, building safety inside work practices demands purposeful hard work towards 
the goal. 
 
This study examines safety with the cultural approach. To build safety into 
organizational practices and employees’ routines, safety culture needs to be enhanced to 
integrate safety into the mindset of all doing. Safety is an essential element that needs to 
be built into culture of determining practices in nuclear power plants and that mindset 
has to reach all employees. Välikangas (2010) use the term unthinkable-to-describe 
situations, where imaginative thinking is needed to cope with issues that are possible but 
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unlikely. Safety has to embedded into practices, even when accidents are unthinkable by 
their nature. 
 
Safety culture is a term that is commonly used in high-risk industries to discuss 
organizational aspects that affect safety (Flin et al., 2000). Safety culture as a term was 
established 30 years ago when it came into discussion that social and organizational 
forces affect safety together with technical and human errors that have historically been 
understood as the components of safety. In safety science, organizational aspects of 
nuclear power plant performance were raised into an issue in 1979, when U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) investigation report of the accident of Three Mile 
Island stated the problem in the first line of their report summary. 
 
 “The one theme that runs through the conclusions we have reached is that the 
principal deficiencies in commercial reactor safety today are not hardware 
problems, they are management problems” (Rogovin, 1980).   
 
The quote shows clearly the importance of management that was acknowledged in the 
investigations. As the technological robustness has developed, accidents tend to be 
results of organizational aspects rather than design failures in the technology (Silbey, 
2009).   
 
The actual term “safety culture” was introduced by IAEA after Chernobyl nuclear 
accident in 1986. IAEA’s accident investigation report stated that the lack of safety 
culture was one component of the accident (INSAG, 1986). IAEA has defined safety 
culture as “The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and 
individuals, which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance”. In IAEA documents, the 
definition has remained untouched until today.  Since the term has been acknowledged, 
many accident investigations after 1986 have cited lack of safety culture as a contributor 
of accidents in high-risk industries (Morrow et al., 2014). The use of the term safety 
culture has expanded from the nuclear industry also to studies of other safety critical 
industries and the term has gained a lot of attention among researchers lately (Sibley, 
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2009). Lack of safety culture has been mentioned as a reason for accidents in different 
type of organizations for the past 30 years. 
 
Another popular definition of safety culture commonly used in literature was made by 
the U.K. Health and Safety Commission’s Advisory committee on the safety of nuclear 
installation (ACSNI) in 1993. Their definition of safety culture “The product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of 
behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organization’s health and safety management” is referred to in many academic papers 
(Clarke, 2000). 
 
These definitions of safety culture are made by people who do not have roots in 
anthropology where the concept of culture has been studied for decades before the 
theme started to interest safety-critical organizations (Haukelid, 2008). This cultural 
turn in safety science has its roots in the military and engineering professions, and 
culture is looked as a way to ensure technological efficiency (Silbey, 2009). Researchers 
who have actively discussed the concept of safety culture are mainly from the fields of 
engineering, management and psychology, accompanied with sociology and political 
science (Silbey, 2009). 
 
Safety culture has also been studied through different terms. Safety climate and safety 
attitudes are terms that are also used in literature to investigate phenomena close to 
safety culture (Glendon et al., 2006).  Safety climate and safety culture have been 
historically studied independently but in many studies, safety climate is seen as one 
component of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000). In these studies, climate is seen as a 
visible or measurable part of safety culture when culture is understood as a long-term 
strategic aspect that is harder to measure (Glendon et al., 2006). Moreover, Silbey 
(2009) criticizes that safety culture studies often use surveys to collect empirical data 
but the questions tend to focus on safety climate even when the researcher has claimed 
to study safety culture.  
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Safety culture affects the way an individual recognizes safety hazards in work 
performance, and therefore, the culture is a major force of individual work performance 
(Reason, 1998). Oedewald et al. (2015) define that the essence of good safety culture 
are organizations’ ability and willingness to prevent hazards in their daily operations. 
Good safety culture is needed to make sure that individuals remember the hazardous 
character of their work even during the times when no mistakes have been made. That is 
the hard part in sustaining safety. Maintaining good safety culture during times when no 
accidents have occurred is a challenging task for all safety-critical industries (Carroll, 
1998), it is extremely hard to maintain the desired safety culture even when it is known 
that, as the technology has developed, the problems that occur are increasingly caused 
by human and organizational hazards rather than technical problems. Human mind tends 
to forget its own limitations and that can lead to extreme accidents if the level of safety 
culture manages to decrease over the accident-free periods.  
 
The understanding of social safety aspects has led to a shift from looking at personal 
performance and technical features to evaluation of the effects of the organizational 
aspects (Mearns at al., 2003). Organizational aspects are noted to cause accidents more 
likely than human errors because it is organizational aspects and unsafe culture that 
contribute to the leak and gaps in defenses-in-depth (Reason, 1998). These gaps are 
created in organizational manners, not by individual human errors.    
 
It has been noted, that even when the term safety culture was established to determine 
organizational aspects affecting safety performance, the term has been increasingly used 
to measure individual behavior (Mearns at al., 2003). Organizational safety culture can 
be seen as a component that affects individual behavior, and therefore, safety culture is 
also used to measure individual behavior expectations (Glendon et al., 2006).  
 
Reason (1998) characterizes the differences of individual and organizational accidents 
by the consequences. Organizational accidents may be rare, but their consequences are 
widespread when individual accidents tend to have only limited consequences and short 
history. Organizational accidents are the ones that are protected by multiple complex 
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defenses but still manage to happen. These accidents are the ones that safety culture is 
trying to prevent from happening. 
 
The concept of safety culture has been criticized as well as valued among researchers 
(Cox & Flin, 1998). It is argued, that the harmony model of organizational life has 
shortcomings that undermine the whole concept (Antonsen, 2009). Safety culture is 
argued to be overrated and lack empirical validation (Clarke, 2000). Antonsen (2009) 
studied the relation between power and culture and tried to explain the problematic 
nature of the term. He states that some organizational safety researches have abandoned 
the term in total because of the mixed understandings that people tend to have towards 
it. 
 
A famous organizational safety scholar Charles Perrow is known for his lack of use of 
the term. He abandoned the whole term culture from his famous book “Normal 
Accidents (1984) where he analyzes the social side of technological risk especially in 
high-risk organizations. Perrow (1984) studies the importance of management and 
training but avoids talking about culture as he sees power relations to be in the center of 
safety. The power-oriented perspective to organizational safety takes in to consideration 
the power relations that need to be analyzed deeper than organizational culture studies 
typically tend to address (Antonsen, 2009).  
 
Studies of safety culture have been criticized for simplicity and narrow understanding of 
the concept of culture (Haukelid, 2008). Sibley (2009) states that safety culture studies 
invoke the iconic concept and leave outside much of the work sociologists and 
anthropologists have done to build a coherent theoretical edifice to the phenomenon. 
Studies of safety culture, however, have helped high-risk industries like nuclear industry 
to develop their understanding of maintaining safe operations and to open up their 
engineering-based approach. 
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2.2.4 SAFETY CULTURE STUDIES IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 
 
Researchers have created theories and assessment criterions for safety culture 
evaluation, and the phenomena and development methods have been under discussion 
widely. Many of these studies have discussed the concept and factors of safety culture 
in the context of nuclear industry (Oedewald et al., 2015). Silbey (2009) states that the 
term safety culture has even become a constantly repeated mantra in the industry. Even 
though the need for good safety culture has been acknowledged and its meaning has 
been studied, Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 showed once again that further 
understanding of safety culture still needs to be developed. The accident underlined the 
importance of different actors’ role in the ensemble (Oedewald et al., 2015). 
 
Reason (1998) pointed out that safety culture has a bigger role in preventing accidents 
in high-technology industries like nuclear industry. He stated that the complex defense-
systems reduce the likelihood of the accidents to the point where employees easily start 
to forget the importance of all the layered defense-systems. The importance of safety 
might be forgotten when the technology is so advanced and robust that the employees 
start to feel that nothing can happen in their advanced safety environment (Carroll, 
1998). Safety science community has developed criterion for developing and analyzing 
safety culture but the question of integrating this knowledge into practices of the nuclear 
licensee organizations might still need optimizing (Oedewald et al., 2015). 
 
Empirical evidence of operational safety contributors in nuclear industry is still rare 
(Sorensen, 2002). Management and organizational factors influence is more readily 
available in other high-risk industries. It is agreed that worker attitudes towards safety 
make a difference although the mechanisms by which it happens are unclear. Many 
studies assume indirectly that plants with low accident rates most probably have better 
safety culture (Lee, 1998). Sorensen (2002) states that the statistical evidence that links 
safety culture with the safety performance is surprisingly rare in the nuclear industry.  
 
Reason (1998) proposes that the best way to sustain awareness of safety issues in 
practice is to gather continuous data of incidents and near misses as well as proactive 
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activities. The objective is to create a safety information system that informs the 
employees continuously about the knowledge available about the human and technical 
as well as organizational and environmental factors that affect safety. Moreover, Reason 
(1998) states that information is the best way to sustain a respectful wariness in times 
when no unwanted events have occurred. To reach the environment of open information 
flow, he suggests building systematically a culture of reporting where the smallest slips 
and mistakes would be noticed in a positive light to increase the level of knowledge of 
the hazardous nature of the work. 
 
Some researchers have focused on evaluating the influence of safety management and 
culture interventions. Carroll (1998) studied learning practices in the nuclear industry to 
analyze linked assumptions and logics to organizational learning. He places culture as 
one of the resources for organizational learning in his study. Morrow et al. (2014) 
describe that only from the 2000s researchers have activated to measure the link 
between safety culture and safety performance in the nuclear industry. Moreover, 
Morrow et al. (2014) showed in their study that the relationship between safety culture 
and safety performance is highly depended on the measurement criterion in use.  
 
Lee (1998) described that the methods that mostly have been in use to measure safety 
performance have been the key performance indicators and safety audits. He highlights 
the importance of safety surveys to accomplish the previous methods. When the key 
performance indicator is a numeric index of performance and safety audit emphasizes 
that the methods needed are in use, safety surveys can be used as indicators of the 
employees’ perception of the safety culture. 
 
Mengolini & Debarberis (2007) studied the implementation of a methodology for safety 
culture enhancement and investigated it in the environment of a research reactor. They 
studied how the IAEA guidelines for safety culture can be implemented in practice. 
Their study emphasized the importance of leadership and management commitment 
among other measures. 
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To continue to studies which evaluate situations appearing in the nuclear power plants, 
García-Herrero et al. (2013) conclude in their study of safety culture in the nuclear 
industry that the principal acts to achieve results in safety culture would be looking for 
errors, not keeping out of sight when difficult situations arise, and resolving conflicts 
constructively. The study did not consider managerial efforts to achieve safe results.  
Mariscal et al. (2012) assessed safety culture in a nuclear power plant through work 
groups and concluded that involving employees in a safety culture assessment is an 
effective way to cultivate interest among employees and draw attention to the safety 
culture improvement. Motivation, commitment and visible leadership are highlighted in 
the study. They also underlined the importance of management’s belief that safety can 
always be improved. 
  
Martínez-Córcoles et al. (2013) studied how team leaders’ behavior affects employees’ 
safety performance and found out in their quantitative study of the Spanish nuclear 
industry that leaders’ empowering behavior cultivated active safety compliance among 
the employees. Their study is highly important and one of the few studies focusing on 
managers’ direct effect on safety in a nuclear power plant. 
 
In the newest studies of safety culture in the nuclear industry, Gotcheva et al. (2016) 
have investigated cultural features of design in nuclear industry. They considered that 
after the Fukushima accident in 2011 the design and construction phases of a nuclear 
power plant have to be measured again. Their study of a Nordic nuclear industry 
perspective described that cultural features of design showed that the temporary and 
complex nature of a nuclear power plant design project makes it extremely difficult to 
manage and understand the overall picture, and it provides a great challenge to safety 
management and safety culture. 
 
In Finland, a safety culture assessment methodology DISC (Design for Integrated Safety 
Culture) has been developed by VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland) to 
measure safety culture assessment in nuclear industry (Reiman et al., 2012). The DISC 
model uses a fixed criterion to measure organization’s potential for safety. The 
framework is developed to measure organization’s safety culture, understanding the 
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dynamic nature of the phenomenon (Oedewald et al., 2015). Safety culture is 
continuously reforming phenomenon and DISC model emphasizes the need to recognize 
this feature in the assessment. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The DISC model (Reiman et al., 2015) 
 
The DISC model provides criterion for evaluating the state of safety culture. It specifies 
the kind of culture desired from a safety point of view (Oedewald et al., 2015). The 
criteria are not very detailed because of the uniqueness of organizational cultures, and 
therefore, Oedewald et al. (2015) underline the importance of the assessment team’s 
knowledge of the phenomenon as well as good understanding of the model in use. The 
framework evaluates culture on an organizational level.  
 
Oedewald et al. (2015) suggest that safety culture assessment should always consist of 
multiple data collection methods. In addition, other researchers have used triangulation 
to determine safety performance (e.g. Hale et al., 2009; Reiman et al., 2005) because of 
the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. As culture is not constructed only by 
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individuals, it is essential to measure culture as a collective phenomenon. Safety culture 
studies are criticized for forming assessments of culture too easily by investigating only 
individual opinions (Guldenmund, 2000).  
 
Safety & culture are both abstract concepts, and as they are tied together as a concept of 
safety culture, it is no surprise that the phenomenon is challenging to define, without 
even talking about measuring it. In this section, the concept of safety culture is 
discussed through investigating the phenomena of culture, safety and then safety 
culture. In the next section, the academic context of this study is combined together as 
the framework of this thesis. 
 
2.3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
 
In this literature review chapter, academic literature that concerns the topic of the study 
has been introduced. The literature has been gathered under two main subheadings, 
middle managers and safety & culture. Understanding these concepts is essential for the 
empirical research of this study. In this section, the academic literature is first 
summarized and after that, the theoretical framework of the study is presented. 
 
Middle management is the starting point of the study and of the literature review. The 
meaning of this investigation is to examine middle managers’ experiences of their work. 
The area of their work this study investigates is safety management and especially 
safety culture, as it is internationally used in the industry and regulation STUK 
Y/1/2016 section 25 determines that “a good safety culture shall be maintained” in 
nuclear organizations.  
 
Safety culture has multiple definitions as discussed earlier in this chapter but this study 
examines it as a part of organizational culture. Therefore, main principles of 
organizational culture are discussed in the academic research. The phenomenon under 
examination is investigated in the context of nuclear power industry, and therefore, 
safety and regulations are essential parts of the study.  
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The figure 3 is determined based on the academic literature of the study and research 
environment reviewed in this chapter. The study has two main elements in which the 
perspective of the investigation is built on: middle managers and nuclear industry’s 
special need for safety culture.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Summary of the research environment  
 
The literature review of this thesis consists of multiple pieces tied together from several 
disciplines. Management studies and organizational aspects are investigated in the 
context of highly technical nuclear industry where mostly engineers have developed 
organizations from their perspective. This thesis is investigating a complex phenomenon 
but to form a coherent research question, the focus is on middle managers and 
managerial aspects. The research is based on management studies as a research 
background, and there especially middle managers’ strategic position, and middle 
managers in nuclear industry are in the focus of the literature review. The context of the 
study is the Finnish nuclear industry, and as the investigation focuses on middle 
managers’ experience on enhancing safety culture, safety culture and organizational 
culture has to be studied to understand the phenomenon. Together the aspects of the 
study form a research environment, which produces a fascinating research gap from a 
managerial perspective. 
 
 
34 
 
 
Theoretical framework can be called as observations that are looked from a particular 
viewpoint (Alasuutari, 1995). The data sample could be investigated by various 
approaches and the theoretical framework explicitly illustrates the approach chosen for 
the study. The theoretical framework of this study is summarized in the figure 4 to 
explicitly illustrate the point of view this study takes to look at the phenomenon of 
safety culture.  This study tends to get behind the abstract safety culture talk in the 
nuclear industry and investigate middle managers’ experiences. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Theoretical framework of the study 
 
The framework introduces how the research questions in the right column of the figure 
are formed from the context of the study. Middle managers are investigated because 
according to the literature introduced in this chapter, they hold a key position in 
enhancing safety culture, and a good safety culture is a requirement that STUK 
regulates in the context of Finnish nuclear power industry, and nuclear power 
companies are expected to enhance safety culture as they see fit in their organization. 
The study investigates middle managers to complement previous research of safety 
culture from a managerial perspective of safety culture enhancement.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter is dedicated for presenting and justifying the methodical choices made for 
the empirical study. Research perspective, method and methodology will be presented 
in this chapter together with introduction to the licensee organizations. The chapter ends 
with evaluation of the trustworthiness of the study. 
 
3.1. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
Academic research is often categorized into either qualitative or quantitative research 
(Alasuutari, 1999).  Quantitative research is often based on surveys and numeric data 
and the focus is on large samples and therefore reliable results, when qualitative 
research approach focuses on the quality and depth of the data, and therefore, uses more 
ethnographic methods to research (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  
 
Many studies of safety culture are based on quantitative data and surveys. Research 
based on surveys is essential in understanding an organization’s development state of 
safety culture on a wide scale across the organization. On another hand, qualitative 
research is needed to understand deeper the phenomena in practice. Mengolini & 
Debarberis (2008) found in their comparative study that survey-based safety studies 
gave generally more positive results than interview studies. Studies of safety culture 
have shown that multiple research styles need to be conducted to understand safety 
indicators, as one study alone can be misleading because of the complexity of the 
phenomenon (Reiman et al., 2005). This thesis is looking at the phenomenon from a 
managerial viewpoint in an in-depth study. The objective is to complement existing 
research of safety culture. Qualitative research method helps the study to seek for rich 
data with complex and multidimensional expressions (Alasuutari, 1999). Qualitative 
research approach has been chosen because it allows the study to better investigate how 
middle managers experience safety culture.  
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The ontological starting point estimates that the data collected in this study provides a 
representation of experiences, which can develop during time and change in interaction. 
The research approach of this study is critical realism where the assumption is that 
social actors produce reality but the presence of the existing structures are 
acknowledged (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Edwards et al. (2014) summarize critical 
realism as follows: “critical realism holds that an (objective) world exists independently 
of people’s perceptions, language or imagination. It also recognizes that part of that 
world consists of subjective interpretations which influence the ways in which it is 
perceived and experienced”. The approach is used to focus on middle managers’ 
experiences in the fixed context and in the regulatory environment. Critical realism is 
often used for finding the basic conditions of the phenomenon studied (Danermark et 
al., 2001), which in this study means the middle managers’ experiences. The 
philosophical base of the study points out that collected data offers an example of 
interpretations, and it should not be simplified to be the only truth of the phenomenon. 
 
The approach to empirical research in this thesis is research-question driven. The need 
to study middle managers’ experiences of developing good safety culture has risen from 
previous research in the field of safety culture studies in high-risk industries. The 
question has evolved from the need to understand better how practitioners experience 
safety culture development when it is recognized that the abstract term safety culture is 
mainly in use on the management level. This study contributes to the existing literature 
by concentrating on middle managers’ sensemaking of the phenomenon. The focus of 
the study is on the meaning that middle managers give to the phenomena, but also on 
how they think that they can affect the development of the safety culture, their 
experiences and the shared meanings in the power plant. The content of empirical data 
is important, but the interaction in the interview gives the study an optimal environment 
to deeply understand the meanings of the sentences together, the complexity of 
sensemaking. 
 
The study is chosen to consider all operating nuclear power plants in Finland, as there 
are only four operating reactors. The operating plants belong to two licensees, which 
both operate 2 reactors. The organizations are introduced in more detail in the next 
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section. The analyses include studying the context in which Finnish nuclear power 
companies operate, the national requirements and international standards. 
 
In this study, middle managers are seen as the managers of the team leader or supervisor 
level. This means the level of managers, who supervise shift managers in the 
organization. The idea of this limitation is to focus on managers who are somewhere 
between the organizational strategy making and shop-floor workers. The study tries to 
emphasize the complex role of these managers who work in the cross pressure of the 
workforce and strategy. 
 
The study takes into consideration the interviews of managerial experiences as a 
primary source of empirical material and investigates the documentation of safety 
culture that affects the work of middle managers in the context of Finnish nuclear power 
plants. In other words, official documentation of safety culture objectives and 
requirements is studied as written secondary data. Academic definitions of safety 
culture have been gathered together by several researchers (Guldenmund, 2000). 
Viitanen collected practitioner-based safety culture statements together even in the 
Finnish context in Oedewald et al. (2015), but this study will focus on the context of 
written definitions by practitioners of the field to construct a coherent entirety of the use 
of the term safety culture in official documents. The study will develop a complete 
picture of the rubrics and policies that might affect the emerging safety culture in the 
nuclear power plants. Even though the middle managers perhaps will not connect their 
understanding to the official standards, the base of the development of “good safety 
culture” in Finnish nuclear power plants lies in the official specifications. For 
conducting this study, it is important to understand from where the assumptions and 
understandings of middle managers develop. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH LICENSEES 
 
The sample has been narrowed to operating plants to focus on a clear target group. 
Middle managers in operating plants indicate stable operations situation and can be seen 
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as a holistic picture of the phenomenon. As the core of this study is to investigate 
middle managers’ role in enhancing safety culture concerning nuclear safety and if the 
research questions had taken into consideration middle managers of all nuclear 
organizations, the focus would have changed, as all organizations are not yet operating a 
plant because they are in design and construction phases. Therefore, the meaningful 
study of Finnish nuclear power plants’ safety culture development from the perspective 
of middle management was decided to be concentrated only on the plants in operation. 
 
The organizations operating nuclear power plants in Finland are introduced in this 
chapter. In Finland, two organizations have the license to operate nuclear power plants. 
Both of the organizations operate two reactors, and in both organizations, the reactors 
are operated by the same organization. The licensee organizations themselves are 
different in nature. The companies are introduced to outline the environment where the 
middle managers work. The different nature of the organizations also helps to form a 
clearer picture of how Finnish operating environment and Finnish regulations affect 
safety management, as the organizations themselves are different. 
  
One of the two licensees is a Finnish nuclear power company that only operates in the 
field of nuclear energy. It is a public company that produces electricity to its 
shareholders in cost price. The shareholders of the company are Finnish power 
companies. The company operates in Finland, and in 2015, the average number of 
personnel was 791. The organization was founded in 1969 and has been operating one 
of the two Finnish nuclear power plants since the construction of the plant. 
 
The other research organization is a Finnish corporation operating in the energy industry 
and nuclear business is one of their business areas. The organization co-owns nuclear 
capacity altogether in eight reactors in Finland and Sweden (2015). The plant this study 
focuses on is fully owned by the company and is located in Finland. The number of 
personnel in the end of the year 2015 was 7835. The corporation is structured into three 
business divisions and the division that operates nuclear power also includes, for 
example, hydro and thermal power production. 
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Both nuclear companies are hierarchic organizations and have structured the technical 
operations in a fairly similar way. The organizations have similarities in the 
organizational structure where operations, engineering and maintenance functions could 
be adjusted as the core trio. The operations functions in both companies are structured 
similarly so that the basic idea is that the employees working with the different reactors 
are separated in different teams that work in the power plant around the clock. In 
general, the shift-teams have team leaders, shift supervisors and a function manager. In 
the maintenance and engineering functions, different teams in both organizations are 
organized to work with specific specialization areas in teams. 
 
The charts of the organizational structure of the nuclear power plants are rather low as 
the number of permanent employees is compact. The middle managers in this study are 
working below the executive board and the functions are very different in nature. 
Middle managers are responsible for teams, which differ in the size, structure and 
education level. Some of them have immediate supervisors working under them, but 
some of the middle managers were working directly as immediate supervisors in small 
teams. 
 
3.3. DATA GATHERING METHOD 
 
Empirical data is often gathered for business research in forms of primary or secondary 
data (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). In this study, both primary and secondary data are 
used.  Secondary may have been collected for other purposes that can be different from 
the purpose used in the study (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). The secondary data used in 
the study is based on public documents. Primary data is collected for the specific 
problem to help to investigate the research problem (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2004).  
 
In this study, middle manager interviews were conducted through the link to the 
authority. The study is a commission to Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in 
Finland. The link was helpful for gathering data, as it enabled the researcher to access 
nuclear power companies, which have very high safety and security requirements. 
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Access to the Finnish nuclear power companies has been utilized through the authority 
and the link to the authority also provides a great environment for understanding the 
context of the study. The access to the organizations is easier in this study but it does 
not automatically come with trust towards the thesis study. The trust of the organization 
has to be built personally (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). The study is conducted to 
investigate middle managers’ challenging role in the context of Finnish nuclear 
industry, and there is no motive to analyze individual performances or organizations’ 
capabilities to enhance good safety culture alone. Political threats and fears to let an 
outsider into the organizations’ work life is risky (Brayboy & Deyhle, 2000) as the 
intents of an unknown person cannot be known, and this is especially so in nuclear 
industry, which the media always finds interesting. This study is not evaluating the 
company or their employees but tends to find new knowledge of the middle managers’ 
experiences. 
 
3.3.1 SECONDARY DATA 
 
Secondary data can be used to find information but also to understand the phenomenon 
under investigation (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). Secondary data provides information 
that is important in research, as the written rules and regulations are increasingly 
determining the world (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008).  To understand better the context 
where middle managers operate and how they base their understanding of safety culture, 
together with interviews, practitioners’ official definitions of safety culture are 
discussed in written format. The empirical study is limited to focus on Finnish nuclear 
industry, an in-depth study of the situation in Finland. To be able to focus on matters 
that concern Finnish nuclear industry, the investigation of written material is limited to 
documents that directly affect Finnish nuclear power companies’ activities. The 
investigation takes into account organizational documents, national regulations and 
international requirements that concern Finnish nuclear industry. 
 
The empirical study of the written documents is focused on documentation that 
explicitly states the term “safety culture”. Because of the high regulations, written 
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materials of nuclear operations and management systems are plenty, and therefore it is 
meaningful to limit the study explicitly from the beginning. Written documents are 
found from organizational company level, concern level, national level and international 
standard level by multiple international organizations. The study consists of (1) 
gathering the materials that explicitly say something about safety culture and (2) 
analyzing the context of the references. From these angles, the study tries to emphasize 
the complexity of the term and the different meanings that parties give to the term in the 
nuclear industry. 
 
The objective to study documents together with the interviews is to study the role of 
middle managers and the challenging aspects of implementing organizational policy and 
regulations into a good safety culture. Therefore, personal performance of middle 
managers is not evaluated in this study or their capabilities to follow regulations 
concerning safety culture. The study will draw an overall picture of the essential role of 
middle managers in developing good safety culture in Finnish nuclear power plants. 
 
3.3.2 MIDDLE MANAGER INTERVIEWS 
 
Interviews are one of the most used data gathering methods. They are used to 
understand individual aspects of a research phenomenon (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2004). 
Interviews are used to collect primary data that help to answer the specific research 
problem. Data has to be collected from the data sources before the study can be 
conducted (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). Interviews were chosen for primary data 
because middle managers are not working in a shop-floor context and observation of 
their work would have been hard to conduct as a person not working in the power plant. 
Observations would have been another interesting investigation but in this study they 
were excluded because of the safety-critical specialties of the target organizations. As 
nuclear power plants are closed work environments, special permissions are needed to 
enter the plant itself, and therefore, observations of interventions and interaction were 
not a possibility for this study.  
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The focus and the interviewees of the study are middle managers because they are the 
people who actually execute safety culture regulations and organizational strategy & 
policies. The interviews are semi-structured theme-interviews. The semi-structured 
interview means that the questions are the same for each interviewee but their answers 
have an effect on the order of the questions (Eskola & Suoranta, 1998). The interviews 
were designed in themes, which were based on the preliminary research questions of the 
study. The theme interviews are based on the themes that are the same to all 
interviewees but otherwise flexible to follow the interviewees’ perceptions (Ghauri & 
Grønhaug, 2005). Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008) conclude that the major advantage in 
this type of interviews is the systematic approach in the materials and flexibility to 
adjust according to the tone of the interview and set an informal interview environment. 
 
The study consists of 12 interviews of middle managers in operating plants. The number 
of the interviews was chosen based on the need to get interviews from all main 
functions of operating plants, including individuals from operations, maintenance and 
engineering functions. The interviews are constructed of 6 middle managers per 
operating nuclear power plant licensee.  
 
This allocation has been made to get an overall picture of the roles of middle managers 
in operating nuclear power plants. Operations, maintenance and engineering are all core 
functions of operating a plant and together they demonstrate the heterogeneity of the 
middle managers’ role, as the functions themselves are very dissimilar. Operations 
functions are in charge of running the power plant. The function consists generally of 
employees who work in shifts 24 hours a day to run the power plant. The maintenance 
function, instead, is responsible for the power plant’s condition and maintenance of the 
systems and technology. The third function, engineering, is responsible for designing 
new solutions and modifications to the power plant.  
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Figure 5. Number of the interviews 
 
The interviewees were chosen together with the licensees, as the organizations are 
unique and cooperation ensured the interviewees to be chosen meaningfully. The 
themes of the interviews were (1) middle managers’ work and tasks, (2) defining safety, 
culture and safety culture, (3) safety culture in the target organization, (4) Safety 
management and leadership and (5) connection to wider context, strategy and 
regulations. These themes were selected to enable the interviewee to interpret the 
phenomenon from several perspectives.  
 
The interviews of this study were 60-90 minutes long meetings in the workplace of the 
interviewees. The environment was common for the interviewees to ease any unneeded 
tension and formality from the interview. All material used in the thesis is anonymous 
and a reader nor the organizations will not be able to recognize from which plant the 
quote is given. This is done because the Finnish nuclear industry concerns only two 
operating licensees and four operating plants altogether. 
 
3.4. DATA ANALYSIS METHOD 
 
The objective of a qualitative research is to understand the studied phenomena better 
(Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005), and the analyses were conducted in themes to collect 
content of various aspects of the phenomenon. The study was analyzed by thematic 
analyses. It is a research method, which categorizes data into themes based on the 
empirical findings. A thematic analysis is a method that can be used in different 
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theoretical backgrounds, which offers freedom to the researcher (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). It also concentrates on the core of the study and forms a thick base for the 
researcher to use other methods in later studies (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Therefore, 
using thematic analysis in a thesis was chosen to concentrate on the most important 
factors, themes of the findings. The approach was chosen to analyze the connections 
between the interviewees’ experiences and to simplify the complex interview data to 
catch the relevant findings. Thematic approach helps the researcher to find patterns and 
conduct statements of the findings.  
 
The study is based on the in-depth analysis of middle managers’ experiences, and 
therefore, the interviews are recorded and transcribed. The objective was to analyze the 
content of the interviews in themes and connect them together. As the analysis method 
takes into account interview material in a complex entity, word-for-word transcription 
was needed to analyze the spoken words as they are linked together and create together 
a bigger meaning than what the sentences alone produce. The transcriptions give the 
researcher a possibility to find connections between interviews and adjust a coherent 
entity (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2004). As the interviews were transcribed, common 
understandings and interpretations were linked to each other. 
 
The thematic approach was selected prior to the empirical study as it suited well the 
structure of the study. The interviews were first analyzed based on the themes 
recognized before the empirical study and then restructured around the most important 
issues raised from the study. The restructure method helps to find the important 
connections and form a logic to the findings (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The themes were 
settled before the data collection but because the interviews were theme interviews, it 
was recognized that as the data gets analyzed, the themes might drift and other 
interesting themes might occur and rise from the data.  
 
The themes recognized before the data was gathered were (1) middle managers’ 
understanding of the concept of safety culture, (2) safety culture of the target 
organizations introduced by how the middle managers understand it, (3) middle 
managers’ practices of enhancing safety culture and (4) how official safety culture 
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regulations, international standards and company strategy are seen from the light of the 
middle managers’ experiences. After the transcription process, findings were collected 
based on these categories but the nature of the study also made it possible to 
acknowledge new themes that occurred in the interviews. One of the new themes 
recognized during the process was that majority of the interviewees mentioned 
recruitment and importance of the new employees. Another theme that arose from the 
data was trainings held in the organizations. These themes were included in the analysis 
as important factors of the middle managers’ experience of developing safety culture.  
 
The descriptive quotes of the interviews were collected together under the recognized 
themes and translated into English for the thesis by the researcher. Collecting the quotes 
together with the analysis started to form a coherent picture of the phenomena and 
encouraged the research further. After the interview material was analyzed, the findings 
were organized under the research questions to be able to answer the questions that were 
placed as the target of the study. The findings chapter was divided into subheadings by 
the research questions to answer the questions directly. This formulation was helpful for 
the analysis as the themes and findings needed to be brought together to construct a 
coherent ensemble. 
 
The themes shifted along the process, and the analysis process also revealed a need to 
reform the research questions. Qualitative research method enables readjusting the 
research question when the sample of reality gathered for the study refers to a research 
question that was not realized to be important before gathering the data (Alasuutari, 
1999). Because of the exploratory nature of the study, the research questions were 
adjusted around the important findings of the study.  
 
The focus shifted towards analyzing deeper the middle managers’ own position and 
experience of the enhancement of safety culture. The practice perspective was limited 
out of the study to focus on middle managers’ perceptions of the phenomenon. The 
themes that arose as the most important ones were finally reformed around the reformed 
research questions as a structure of the empirical findings chapter. The findings were 
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then reflected on literature and previous studies of the phenomenon to find connections 
and to show how the findings complement previous studies. 
 
3.5. TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE STUDY 
 
Reliability, validity and generalizability are acknowledged to be the key principles of 
business research trustworthiness evaluation (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Especially 
reliability and validity have been criticized about their quantitative nature (Hirsjärvi & 
Hurme, 2004). Many evaluation criterions are developed for quantitative research, and 
therefore, should not be used in qualitative research without closer examination 
(Golafshani, 2003). Evaluation of a qualitative research always needs to be in line with 
the research type to get valuable insight of the study (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). It 
is important to evaluate the study based on the methods used in the exact research. 
Qualitative research approach enables various methods to conduct a research, and there 
is no universal way to evaluate qualitative research.  
 
Unlike in quantitative research, qualitative studies have been criticized of vague 
evaluation of trustworthiness. Qualitative research is deeply dependent on the researcher 
and the evaluation focuses on the arguments the researcher is capable to address about 
the trustworthiness of the study (Eskola & Suoranta, 1998). The research itself is 
strongly influenced by the researcher, and therefore, evaluating qualitative research is 
an important part of the study. In qualitative research, the study is evaluated repeatedly 
through the research process because of the nature of the study, which relies on the 
decisions of the researcher (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Because of these elements, 
qualitative research often introduces researcher’s decisions in detail through the process. 
 
The evaluation method is chosen based on the nature and audience of the study 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). In this study, classic evaluation criterion, reliability and 
validity are used to evaluate the trustworthiness. Efforts have been made to emphasize 
reliability by introducing researcher’s decisions through the whole thesis by showing in 
detail the process and decisions that affect the trustworthiness of the study. The 
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objective is that a reader is capable of following the researcher’s thoughts in detail 
through the process. The findings of the study are accompanied with several quotes 
from the data collection to show how the analyses are conducted. 
 
Before collecting data, the reliability of the research questions is an important step to 
evaluate (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2004). In this study, the questions were reflected and 
cross-checked several times to ensure the quality of the themes and questions. Through 
the research process, reliability has been highlighted by minimizing the effect of the 
researcher’s own background. It is important to notice that in this kind of research the 
background and mindset of the researcher, however, affect the way of the study. Even 
when the analysis would have gotten the same conclusion, it is up to the researchers’ 
mindset, which perceptions one chooses as the most important and interesting findings 
of the study. The analyses highlight findings that are common in the interviews, but also 
introduce unique perceptions, which are especially interesting and reflect directly on the 
research questions. 
 
The quality and validity of the interview material is essential for the reliability of the 
study (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2004).  The reliability of the study has been emphasized also 
by giving the interviewees an opportunity to check the validity of the quotes used in the 
study. This has been done to make sure, that the researcher has not twisted the message 
in the translation process by understanding the content of the interview differently than 
meant to. 
 
The validity of the study has been emphasized by highlighting that the context of the 
study is the Finnish nuclear industry. The study has focused primarily on the Finnish 
context, and therefore the results should not be generalized outside the context without 
closer examination. The objective of the study has been to understand middle managers’ 
experiences in the Finnish context and therefore generalization has not been 
emphasized. This explorative study has focused on introducing findings of a study 
which complements previous research by focusing on middle management, and 
therefore, it is important to acknowledge that the findings are explorative in nature, and 
do not tend to generalize the nature of the phenomena under investigation.  
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Moreover, the validity of the study has been highlighted by taking into examination 
both organizations which operate nuclear power plants in Finland. Triangulation of data 
is a commonly used method to find multiple perspectives and find trustworthiness to the 
study (Eriksson & Kovlainen, 2008). This is done in this study to be able to generalize 
the findings into the Finnish context. By entering two organizations into the study, 
special characteristics of the organizations and temporary situations occurring in the 
power plants are not affecting the findings of the study as dramatically as they would in 
a research conducted in only one organization. Golafshani (2003) states that in 
qualitative research the stability of the measurement is extremely important. By 
examining two licensee organizations, the sample can be trusted to illustrate a more 
stable situation without highlighting specialties of a single organization. 
 
This chapter has altogether introduced the methods and methodology of the study. After 
stating the research approaches, licensee organizations were introduced and data 
gathering method was expressed and validated. Furthermore, the data analysis method 
and trustworthiness of the study were emphasized before entering the next chapter of 
empirical findings. In the following chapter, the study based on the approaches 
acknowledged in this chapter is introduced. The empirical findings chapter includes 
quotes from the data as well as analysis of the research material. 
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
In this chapter, the findings of the study are presented. First, safety culture regulations 
and requirements are introduced and analyzed. After that, the licensee organizations’ 
safety culture statements are investigated to form a picture of the use of the term on the 
public level. Finally, the chapter introduces the empirical findings of the middle 
manager interviews. The chapter ends with a conclusion of the empirical findings.  
 
4.1. SAFETY CULTURE REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
 
As mentioned before, nuclear industry is highly regulated. In this section, the operating 
environment of nuclear power licensee organizations is explained from the legal and 
authoritative viewpoint. This section does not tend to explain the complex regulatory 
environment as a whole but to introduce the main elements that affect safety culture 
enhancement processes in the licensee organizations. 
 
A good safety culture is required from the nuclear power licensees, and the licensee 
organizations have to follow the Finnish regulations in their operations as they in the 
same time follow the international standards and recommendations of the international 
nuclear safety organizations. In Finland, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority STUK 
oversees the work of the licensee organizations. STUK oversees that the licensee 
organizations follow the regulations and determines requirements if the regulations are 
not met. This work is based on official documentations where the licensee organizations 
describe their actions and STUK oversees if the regulations are met. The evaluation is 
based on documentation and inspections.  
 
In this section, the requirements regarding safety culture are investigated to introduce 
the environment where the nuclear companies operate. The term safety culture is 
required by the word in the Finnish context, and therefore the focus is on documents 
that explicitly state a requirement about safety culture.  
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On the international level, International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA has brought the 
term into use. They define safety culture as “the assembly of characteristics and 
attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance.” (INSAG, 1991). IAEA has a lot of material available regarding safety 
culture from the theoretical level to the practical instructions for safety culture 
embedding work. They have also created a framework for a strong safety culture, which 
is included in their safety standards. They use the word “strong” to describe the desired 
safety culture.  
 
 
Figure 6. Safety culture characteristics (IAEA, 2009) 
 
The safety culture framework helps licensees to understand how safety culture is formed 
and which characteristics affect the occurring safety culture in the nuclear power plants. 
The characteristics are explained in detail in the IAEA safety guide GS-G-3.5, which 
introduces the desired management system for nuclear installations. The guide is part of 
the safety series of IAEA. These guides are important, because STUK requires licensees 
to take into account IAEA’s guidelines in their operations. 
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In the Finnish context, the term safety culture is mentioned in the regulation of STUK. 
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Safety of a Nuclear 
Power Plant STUK Y/1/2016 Section 25, Ensuring safety by management, orgsanisation 
and personnel, state the main principle of safety culture. 
 
“When designing, constructing, operating and decommissioning a nuclear 
power plant, a good safety culture shall be maintained.”  
 
The regulation itself includes all organization and personnel related issues embedded in 
the same section, and therefore, safety culture and meaning behind the term is explained 
in more detail in the explanatory memorandum. In the explanatory memorandum of the 
regulation, the phenomenon has been referred to multiple times. 
 
 “…the organization shall have a high level of safety culture” (p.7).  
 
The phenomenon also has its own section explaining what was meant with the safety 
culture statement in the regulation.  
 
“The licensee and the senior management of the nuclear power plant shall 
visibly and systematically commit to solutions promoting safety and act in a 
manner that ensures the safety of the plant at every level and during each 
procedure. (p.20)” 
 
“The example set by the management plays a key role in maintaining a high 
level of safety culture. Those working at a nuclear power plant shall have good 
capabilities for the continuous development of safety. (p.20)” 
 
“The safety culture of nuclear power plants cannot be based solely on following 
the rules. Training and practical work shall emphasise the necessity for 
everyone to have the required competence for their work and acknowledge the 
importance of their task in terms of the safety of the nuclear power plant. 
(p.20)” 
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These examples show the areas on which the explanatory memorandum focuses 
regarding safety culture. However, it is essential to note that only the sections and 
documents that explicitly include the term “safety culture” are recognized here.  
 
Under the regulation, more specific series of requirements determine how STUK 
follows the regulation. The Regulatory Guides on Nuclear Safety, commonly called as 
YVL guides, are used by both the licensees and the authority to validate the 
requirements in practice. The YVL guides form a holistic package of information 
regarding nuclear safety. Two of the guides refer to management and organizations in 
operating plants and in the following paragraphs, the YVL-guide requirements for 
safety culture are introduced. 
 
Guide YVL A.3 “Management system for a nuclear facility” has dedicated a whole 
section into explaining the safety culture required from the licensees. This section is an 
important guide for licensees as it determines how safety culture has to be taken into 
consideration in the management system. The section has dozens of individual 
requirements, and the first two, which are the most essential to this study, are the 
following. 
 
“310. The management system shall support a good safety culture. In a good 
safety culture, safety is of primary importance, actions are prioritised based on 
their safety significance, the senior management and the entire personnel are 
committed to a high level of safety, the atmosphere is open and fosters a 
questioning attitude, safety is considered systemically, and safety is continuously 
improved.” 
 
In the requirement quoted above, safety culture is determined as an outcome of the 
management system. The requirement is written so that it emphasizes the importance of 
the high level of safety and the entire personnel’s responsibility to embed safety into 
operations. The managerial need to enhance safety is determined in the next quotation. 
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“311. The concept of safety culture shall be made concrete and communicated 
so that the personnel of the organisation share a common understanding of the 
importance of safety culture and its essential attributes and that everyone is able 
to identify, generally and in their own work, factors that strengthen and weaken 
nuclear and radiation safety as well as the safety culture.” 
 
This requirement emphasizes the need to enhance safety culture.  The interesting part 
here is that the requirement states that the personnel share a common understanding of 
the importance of safety culture. The requirement could recall only the importance of 
safety, but it is explicitly required that safety culture needs to be understood among the 
personnel. These two quotations from the guide YVL A.3 show the level of the 
requirements. To complement these requirements, guide YVL A.4 “Organisation and 
personnel of a nuclear facility” has a couple of interesting requirements quoted below. 
These requirements refer to managerial tasks.  
 
351. Managers and supervisors shall, through their own actions, promote the 
safe way of working and reinforce good practices. Managers shall develop the 
values and behavioural expectations of the organisation while setting an 
example themselves in order to promote these values and encourage the 
expected behaviour. The general requirements regarding the safety culture are 
set out in Guide YVL A.3. 
 
The requirement stated above relates generally to supervisors’ safety enhancement but 
also states in the end the connection to safety culture. This quote was brought up among 
the other ones because the requirement states specific expectations among the 
requirements, which are more general in nature. Another requirement that concerns the 
scope of the study and touches the tasks of middle management is also brought up 
below. 
 
353. Managers and supervisors shall ensure that the working conditions and 
arrangements promote the safety culture, the employees’ motivation, and 
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competence. Managers and supervisors shall see to it that the performance 
management and related incentives encourage safe ways of working. 
 
The last quote states explicitly the need for managers and supervisors to ensure and 
promote safety culture. The requirement is specific, but leaves it to the licensee to 
decide how to implement it in practice. This is common in the requirements, as the 
licensees themselves are the best experts on the practices that can be utilized in their 
organizations. The broad requirement is challenging for both the licensee and the 
inspectors, as it leaves a lot of space for individual evaluation. However, the main 
objective is that the licensees are able to fulfill the requirements. 
 
To summarize the safety culture regulations and requirements introduced in this section, 
the regulation determines the need for a good safety culture and YVL guides list more 
specific requirements on the management system, organization and personnel and how 
safety culture in those areas needs to be taken into consideration. The outcome is that 
many small requirements use the term safety culture and in most cases, the term is used 
to make sure that a good safety culture is ensured. The style the requirements are written 
highlights the importance of management and managerial responsibility to enhance 
employees’ commitment to safety. The design of the requirements show that the 
requirements are based on a normative understanding that safety culture is something 
that can be managed and supervisors play a key role in the ensemble. The requirements 
are structured so that safety and safety culture as terms are used hand in hand, and the 
use of the terminology leaves space for the reader’s own reasoning.  
 
4.2. SAFETY CULTURE STATEMENTS OF THE LICENSEES 
 
The licensee organizations have determined their own strategies to develop a good 
safety culture. In this section, these official definitions and public safety culture policies 
of the licensee organizations are introduced. The study of licensee organizations’ 
acknowledgement of safety culture is investigated through their official webpages. The 
nature of the study is not to compare the licensee organizations against each other, and 
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the objective of this section is to form an understanding of how the term is used in the 
organizations and in communication. The licensee organizations have different 
documents available for the public, and therefore it is essential to acknowledge that the 
amount of information that can be found from the webpage does not mean that it would 
be all the material there is in the licensee organizations. In this section, the information 
is introduced and analyzed to form a picture of how the term is in use in the industry, 
not to compare the licensees to each other. 
 
One of the licensees states in their strategic goals for the year 2015 that they “Include 
responsible business practices and guide responsible day-to-day work in line with the 
unconditional safety culture”. Improvement of safety culture has been mentioned as one 
of the development targets of the year 2015. The objective of uncompromising safety 
culture is repeated in the report continuously. In their annual environmental report 
(2015) safety culture is also stated as a company-level policy as follows. 
 
“[The company] and its entire personnel are committed to a high standard of 
safety culture. Safety culture is comprised of organizational practices and 
individuals’ attitudes. Thanks to the safety culture, all factors that affect the 
nuclear power plant’s safety will receive attention in proportion with their 
significance and are given priority in decision making.” 
 
This company-level policy statement underlines the importance of safety culture in 
treating all factors that affect safety according to their safety significance. In nuclear 
industry, safety significance and graded approach are used to measure the level of 
priority and attention given to the factor. The licensee has also created safety culture 
principles for employees in the corporate social responsibility report (2015). 
 
“Safety culture principles: 
- Follow the approved procedures and instructions without compromise 
- Make sure that you and others use safe working practices and work under 
safe conditions 
- Stop and think before you act, and review the consequences of your actions 
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- Report all problems and deficiencies without delay 
- Maintain an atmosphere where reporting can be done freely and without 
blame 
- Question practices and develop operations in the spirit of continuous 
development” 
 
The safety culture principles concretize the behavior the licensee is looking after with 
its safety culture policy. The principles make it easier for the employees to understand 
what is needed from them when “a good safety culture” is asked for. The principles 
show the importance of following instructions and approved work practices. The 
principles, however, also underline the importance of one’s own thinking and 
perception to maintain and develop the safety culture. 
 
The licensee also has an operating culture section in their webpages that introduces the 
safety culture policies along with other key principles of the operating culture. Safety 
culture is introduced as follows. 
 
“Safety culture consists of the organization´s operating methods and the 
attitudes of individual people. It ensures that factors contributing to the safety of 
the nuclear power plant are given the attention they require, and are given 
priority in decision-making. “ 
 
The quote is formed as a definition of safety culture. It underlines the operating methods 
and individuals’ attitudes as the main components of safety culture. The definition also 
mentions the prioritizing of factors that affect safety. These safety culture references in 
different parts of the public documentation form a picture of the approaches the licensee 
has towards safety culture. A high safety culture is seen as a mission of the entire 
personnel and the licensee tends to enhance safety culture by their everyday practices. 
 
The other licensee organization states a lot less in their public web pages. The annual 
report (2015) of the corporation does not include information about safety culture as the 
report summarizes information of all business areas of the company where nuclear 
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power is just one part of the business. This indicates the differences of the organizations 
where the nuclear power plants operate. The environment report of the power plant 
(2015) states safety culture as a part of the mission expression of their plant. 
 
“Maintaining and developing our own competence in nuclear power is a 
prerequisite for safety and competitiveness in our nuclear power operations and 
our nuclear power operations must be based upon a good safety culture.” 
 
The mission statement itself determines the need for a good safety culture. Other reports 
and action plans are not available in the web pages, but in several parts of the web pages 
of the power plant, a high-level safety culture is emphasized. 
 
“Our operations are based on a high-level safety culture and quality and on 
continuous improvement.” – A page introducing nuclear power 
 
“…power plant has continuously improved its safety through annual 
investments, plant modifications and development of its safety culture 
throughout the entire operation of the plant.” – A page of safety in the power 
plants 
 
“All design, constructions and decisions are made with conservative 
assumptions and high safety margins. Continuous improvement in all aspects of 
safe operation, including the know-how of the personnel and safety culture, are 
a high priority..” – A page about safe and reliable production 
 
The quotes show that the phenomenon is included as a part of everyday operations of 
the plant. The term is repeated in many occasions as a part of the base of the operations.  
 
To summarize the safety culture statements of the licensees, this investigation has 
showed that the licensees use the term a lot in their communications in several 
occasions. The term is used in plans and strategies but also in more general statements 
and policies to show the organizational work principles. The way the term is used in the 
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public documentation shows that the need for a safety culture is acknowledged and both 
licensees find it a core value. The sound of the use of the term refers to individuals’ 
responsibility to commit to safety. The licensees’ understanding of the phenomenon 
relies on the approach that safety culture has to be embedded in everything.   
 
The public documentation of the licensees does not refer to managerial responsibility to 
enhance safety culture with the same sound as the requirements of STUK. The 
requirements are written on a managerial base, and licensees’ documentation highlights 
individual responsibility. It is good to acknowledge, however, that the purpose of these 
documentations is fundamentally different, and the difference of the style of the text can 
be explained by the audience the text is meant for. Nevertheless, these dissimilarities 
might indicate differences in the perceptions of safety culture enhancement. In the next 
section, the primary data of the study is introduced to reflect these findings on the 
middle managers’ experiences. 
 
4.3. MIDDLE MANAGEMENT INTERVIEWS 
 
In this section, the middle managers’ interviews are analyzed and the findings are 
introduced. The interviews are analyzed under three subheadings to relate the findings 
directly to the research questions. The analysis includes important findings regarding 
the research questions together with interesting perspectives and perceptions that arose 
in the interviews. The focus of the analysis is, however, on the themes that answer the 
research questions.  
 
4.3.1 THE CONCEPT OF SAFETY CULTURE 
 
In the beginning of the interviews, the middle managers were asked to tell if their 
organizations had defined the term safety culture collectively in the organization. Most 
of the interviewees said that they do not know any official definition to the concept and 
that it is something that people understand in different ways through their own work. 
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The fact that their organizations have defined and opened up the term was unrecognized 
by most of the participants. This question gathered very different answers, and because 
the question is important in our attempt to understand middle managers’ experiences of 
the phenomena, the answers to this underlying question are analyzed in more detail. Six 
of the interviewees did not know that the term had been defined at all. 
 
“I guess that there is not a common definition to the term. At least I have not 
heard it. No, no one is spreading around definitions of what the concept actually 
means.” 
 
“We have had safety culture surveys but to be honest, I don’t really know if the 
term has been defined in a sentence or two by anyone.” 
 
“We all grow to it, to think about safety. I don’t know if there is a definition to 
that [safety culture], but we value safety and keep it high.” 
 
Other two of the interviewees recognized that the term is in use in their organizations 
and particularly at the top management level but they hesitated on stating the definition 
of the term and opening up what the concept of safety culture means in their 
organization.  
 
“I might have heard our organization’s official definition but I don’t remember 
it… It means different things to different people, depending on how they connect 
it [to their work]. It is not a common term, which we would all understand in the 
same way.”  
 
“Probably you can find it from the company’s manuals but for us it is built in 
our operations. In our function, it is not in our own procedures… At least I don’t 
know that it would be.” 
 
Three interviewees approached the concept of safety culture directly from the 
perspective of safety significance.  
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“Our company’s definition is that things get a proper treatment according to 
their safety significance. That is safety culture. We recognize the things that 
have a high safety significance from those which do not have and focus 
correctly.” 
 
“Yes we do have an official definition. What is it? I have to say that I looked it 
up before coming to this interview. But the idea is that it is formed like any other 
culture from the attitudes of the community, which affect all employees. Another 
important factor in the definition is the safety significance approach, meaning 
that things get the importance which they have according to the safety 
significance. That is how I interpret it.” 
 
“The definition is that things are ranked through the safety significance that they 
have.” 
 
One of the twelve interviewees recognized the theoretical background of the definition 
determined by their organization without hesitation: 
 
“The common definition comes from the safety guides of IAEA. It is used as a 
base to our own.” 
 
This interviewee had worked with the phenomenon closer than the others in his work 
tasks. The diversity in the answers was fruitful for the discussion and for the study, as it 
indicates clear diversity among the interviewees and gives reliability to the 
investigation. 
 
The answers show that the official definitions that the licensee organizations have are 
not commonly known in the middle management. The question of the definition of the 
concept was very useful in the beginning of the interview. The interviewees understood 
the concept of safety culture through their own background and experiences, regardless 
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of the fact that the term is used commonly in the industry and academic research studies 
safety culture in the industry closely.  
 
When discussing about the concept through examples of their everyday work, it was 
fundamentally shown how middle managers valued safety in their own work as well as 
in the actions of their employees. They just did not know, if how they understood the 
term was commonly recognized within the organization or of it was just their own 
perception of the phenomenon. This hesitation seemed to spring from their perception 
that safety culture as a term is something used at the top management level, not in 
practice. 
 
“The term safety culture is used at the upper level and top management brings it 
up. At our level, it is included in the procedures and approaches. Of course, we 
understand that it affects safety culture but as the term is so abstract, it is easier 
to divide it into the instructions and procedures. Everyone knows that we aim at 
doing everything safely.” 
 
As the quote shows, the concept was recognized but the interviewees in general were 
more interested in the practices than the theoretical definition. The fact that most of the 
interviewees did not have in mind a shared definition of the concept offered a great 
opportunity to investigate how they understood the concept by themselves.  
 
After asking for the organization’s common definition of the concept, the interviewees 
were asked to define what the term meant for them and in their work. The picture of 
safety culture was manifold and showed that safety culture has been discussed in the 
organizations over time.  
 
“Organizational culture influences the safety culture greatly. How people relate 
to safety and have attitudes towards it. It is safety culture that people follow 
instructions and how they act when the cameras are not on… Safety culture is 
the common way to act so that people respect the safety significance of their 
work tasks.” 
 
 
62 
 
 
“I would highlight the importance of attitudes, they determine safety culture. 
Peoples’ attitudes reform the culture and in here, they have to be safety 
oriented. A community of people builds culture but individuals are the ones who 
bring their attitudes to it.” 
 
“Culture is the way we act. When we combine safety into it, it means that in our 
practices and decisions safety is recognized. So that we always remember safety 
in our actions.” 
 
“Safety culture is not an easy thing to define. It has something to do with safety 
and occupational safety and [safety] climate, openness. It is integrated into our 
activities. It is automatized into all we do… The way I understand it is that 
people are open to tell things, tell about their perceptions, intervene and tell 
about their own mistakes, too. People do not cover things up and the 
organization supports the openness.“ 
 
The answers show that the interviewees have an understanding of the phenomenon as 
many aspects of safety culture, including attitudes, practices and activities as 
components that affect the culture, were brought up. The attitudes of the employees 
were recognized as an essential element of safety culture by several middle managers. 
This perception is essential as the practical view of culture easily focuses mostly on the 
actions taken. The view of safety culture is practical and in most cases, the interviewer 
had to ask several related questions to get an answer to description of safety culture. 
These definitions made by the middle managers are thorough and deeper than was 
expected as they felt that there was not a common definition.  
 
The practical implications the interviewees brought up while discussing about how they 
understand the concept were examples of their basic work tasks, but also indicated some 
shortcomings on the understanding of the abstract term. These expressions are 
investigated in the following quotes. The middle managers started to talk directly about 
the work practices that enhance safety in the nuclear power plants. They all underlined 
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the importance of safety as well as the importance of following the instructions. These 
two walked hand in hand in the interviews one after another. 
 
“Safety culture means that we work in the nuclear power plant… we have rules 
and we follow them.” 
 
“It is a broad term and all, but let’s say that it is about following the approved 
guidelines and procedures.” 
 
The interviews showed strongly that the importance of safety culture relates to 
following the instructions. Talking about safety culture as following the rules was the 
first approach many of the interviewees took to process the phenomenon. The culture is 
a major component of an employee’s willingness to follow instructions and therefore it 
is important that the interviewees recognized the connection.  
 
In addition to discussions of following the instructions, the interviewees highlighted the 
importance of embedding safety-oriented thinking into their work. The attitudes that 
safety is in everything they do were highlighted strongly. 
 
“Safety culture comes through events in here. We discuss about events if they 
affect nuclear safety. It is always in our minds. We do not discuss about safety 
culture as a separate thing.” 
 
“I think that safety culture is built in our practices. My own actions serve safety 
culture. I mean that my actions serve safety. I don’t really know about the 
culture-word. However, it means the spirit [of working safely].” 
 
From these quotes, it can be concluded that middle managers understand the importance 
of safety as their core value, and following the instructions is seen as the most important 
activity to act safely. The interviewees also mentioned events regularly as a point when 
they discuss about safety issues. Events mean situations when even a small, unplanned 
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event has occurred in the power plant. The interviewees showed strongly that safety-
oriented thinking was embedded into their practices during these situations. 
 
The interviews included some straight questions about the work environment, but 
mostly the practices that relate to safety culture arose in the examples the interviewees 
gave about the work in their teams.  
 
“It is in our everyday practices. You cannot see it. We have built these 
operations so that we follow safety culture practices in our normal routines. To 
give an example, if a modification has to be made, the first thing that is thought 
of is the safety significance the system has… And what it said in the 
instructions.” 
 
“You can see safety culture in how people make choices in here. In every 
decision, people have to make a choice so that it is conservative enough for 
safety... For me safety culture means that people have enough time to make good 
decisions and that the decisions are conservative enough. But the word is also 
like a curse. It has been mixed to wrong places and because of that, some 
[other] tasks are left undone or postponed without a reason.” 
 
“We have our rules and guidelines. It starts by following them.” 
 
These expressions speak for the assumption that “a good safety culture” is understood 
as following instructions and making conservative choices to maintain safety in 
operations. The interviews indicated that safety culture would be something they try to 
follow in their work, not so much that it would be something that their own team would 
build for themselves. The discussions showed that the interviewees had not been 
thinking about the concept too much and it was hard for them to come up with their 
definitions. They were, however, well aware of the situations affecting nuclear plant 
safety. Defining safety culture was a hard question but the themes affecting it arose in 
every interview through other questions. 
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The interviews indicated that the use of the term is challenging and calls for theoretical 
understanding. Some interviewees did not respect the use of the term and felt that it 
brings more harm than help to their attempts to understand the phenomenon. According 
to the interviewees, the term is used mostly at the top management level and in the 
operations they talk mostly about the themes behind the term. 
 
“Safety culture can be understood on different levels. When you talk with people 
about safety culture, you always have to tune your speech to the level of the 
counterparty. How they see it and understand it. Sometimes you face these 
problems.” 
 
“I have not used the term safety culture with my team. I don’t think that it is the 
correct way to enhance it, anyhow. To collect everyone together and say that 
let’s talk about safety culture. It sounds really fake. Mostly we talk about the 
issues behind the term, about the small errors, for example; if someone 
recognizes an error, they should be encouraged to bring them up. These are the 
things that need to be discussed, not safety culture as itself.” 
 
The challenge with the abstract term has affected the use of the word so that the 
managers used the term safety culture almost as a synonym to an order to highlight 
safety. The managers talked mostly about their attempts to make the employees 
remember to follow safety culture as if it would be one of the work instructions instead 
of a part of the organizational culture. 
 
“Safety culture comes up in conversations sometimes. It is questioned if the 
operations are in accordance with safety culture.”  
 
“It is good to highlight the importance of safety culture in communication. So 
that the employees do not work against it.” 
 
The comments are based on an understanding where safety culture is a set objective and 
the employees should work according to the culture, which is determined by the top 
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management. This problematic twist can be recognized from several interviews. The 
underlying logic that safety-critical practices are desired but the term safety culture is 
used to measure if the practices pursue the prescribed safety culture, as if it would be an 
objective or an order that needed to be followed. 
 
The middle managers’ experiences of the concept of safety culture show that they 
understand the phenomenon and the need to enhance safety as a core value, while the 
term safety culture is seen as challenging and too abstract. The concept of safety culture 
is challenging to define but as it is widely used in the industry, middle managers face it 
in their work as top management’s core value and in their organizational policy 
statements. Regardless of the hesitation on defining the term, middle managers showed 
understanding towards the need for a good safety culture in a clear manner. Their 
expressions and examples showed that safety is valued among the employees on a deep 
level. 
4.3.2 MIDDLE MANAGERS’ POSITION ON ENHANCING SAFETY CULTURE  
 
This study was planned on an underlying assumption that the middle managers would 
enhance safety culture in their teams actively as one of their work tasks. During the 
interviews, it was clearly indicated that they did not share the underlying idea that it 
would be their task to do so. The middle managers understood their position as team 
leaders and as safety guards but the aspect of enhancing safety culture beneath the 
visible level of artifacts was not recognized without hesitation. The interviewees clearly 
did enhance safety culture as they worked as team leaders but they did not recognize 
those elements as part of “safety culture enhancement” systematically. This was a 
surprise and changed the section of investigating middle managers’ “best practices” into 
investigating their position and experiences in safety culture enhancement. The 
assumption of middle managers’ awareness towards safety culture enhancement was 
based on the literature reviewed for the study. As discussed in the literature review of 
this study, safety cultures’ effect on the nuclear safety is underlined in research, and 
cultural studies emphasize the important position of different levels of management in 
cultural development.  
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None of the interviewees indicated without asking directly that enhancing safety culture 
would be their task. As mentioned before, they valued safety but they did not connect 
enhancing safety in their function to enhancing safety culture even when they clearly 
did that in their work practices. Their examples showed clear managerial attempts to 
enhance safety also on cultural level. 
 
”Safety culture is not a task on my worklist, there is no challenge in it. I don’t 
know who should enhance it. As a manager I try to make sure that our 
operations follow the requirements and that we do not do anything stupid. But it 
does not mean that it would be a core task or anything. As I said before, we 
don’t have that kind of training or point in the regular meeting agenda. So if no 
one asks to talk about safety culture, we do not talk a word about it during the 
year. It is shown in the decisions then, if they are made as good or bad 
decisions. It is present in the thoughts and so it shifts to others as well, the good 
decisions.” 
 
The comment quoted above contains perfectly the atmosphere that was present in many 
of the interviews. It is an answer to a question whether the interviewee enhances safety 
culture as a managerial task. The answer shows that the manager values safety and sees 
that the task of the manager is to promote safe operations. Safety culture, however, is 
seen as too abstract to be a task of a manager to enhance and therefore the interviewees 
did not connect their attempts to enhance safety to safety culture. 
 
The interviewees were asked whether they had been guided to cultural enhancement as 
they work as managers or whether leadership thinking had been developed for them 
from somewhere else. The theme was not discussed in all interviews, but the 
interviewees brought it up on several occasions. The answers showed that the managers 
felt that they had developed their safety culture understanding by themselves. 
 
“No one has said that enhancing safety culture would be my job... We get 
reminders about the importance of the regulations and all that but it is not said 
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that it would be team leader’s task to enhance safety culture. Of course the 
importance of safety is marketed but there is no training where especially 
managers would be adjusted to enhance safety culture.” 
 
“I think that it is part of the job. But it has not been told to me that it would be… 
The instructions and practices of the function are my responsibility and safety 
culture consists of all of these. But I have not thought that it would have been 
told to me that I should look after the safety culture.” 
 
These statements indicate how confusing the concept of safety culture is on the lower 
organizational level in the nuclear power plants. The official statements talk about 
safety culture but it is not used in practice. Regulations and top management use the 
term safety culture but in practice these middle managers (1) see safety culture as 
something that is embedded in everything they do and (2) see safety culture as 
something that they do not do at all. 
 
The findings of the middle managers’ experience of their own position in enhancing 
safety culture show clearly that the interviewed middle managers in general did not 
connect safety management and safety culture management together. The notice that 
safety culture was not recognized as a phenomenon that managers should enhance 
should not be mixed with the safety culture enhancement practices, which they still 
perform. Many of the interviewees showed that their underlying values did cultivate 
safety culture enhancement without saying it aloud. 
 
4.3.3 METHODS TO ENHANCE SAFETY  
 
When discussing about methods of enhancing safety culture, middle managers gave a 
lot of examples from their everyday practices. In the beginning of this section, these 
examples are introduced. Moreover, middle managers’ experiences in developing safety 
culture in their organizations are discussed in this section. 
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Middle managers gave a lot of attention to leading by example. They addressed 
effectively their need to follow the guidelines themselves and to show to others the 
model of how they should work and cultivate desired work practices. 
 
“It is about leading by example. We have to show that things get done as agreed 
and when we have settled rules we also follow them. It is not always financially 
the most effective way but that is what we have to do. Showing example is 
important. We have to act as agreed at all times.” 
 
“It is important that the manager does not slip from following the rules. It easily 
affects the others if the manager jokes about safety or makes decisions which are 
in the gray area. It is easy for the employees to interpret that these issues are not 
important if the manager does so. The manager needs to show example.” 
 
“It is important how much we talk openly about our decisions. It is important 
that if an employee is unsure of the work task, he or she does not guess what to 
do but asks. It is important to show example and make sure, that employees can 
bring up questions if they are unsure.” 
 
Leading by example is shown strongly in the interview sample, and the managers 
clearly understand their role in developing the work culture even if they do not 
recognize that it is what they do by leading by example. Managers showed a deep 
understanding on the power of leading by example in their interpretations and examples. 
They even stated different methods to lead by example and editing employees’ work 
routines without giving them a hint that it was happening. 
 
Another task the interviewees saw important was supervising the work of their team 
members. Many interviewees brought up the importance of controlling the quality of 
their employees’ work and saw the quality controlling as a way to keep up safety 
culture.  
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“Manager has to make sure that everyone knows what they are doing and knows 
their responsibilities. The manager also supervises that the instructions are 
followed and the work tasks are prioritized correctly.” 
 
“It is about keeping up the conservative attitude and giving time to the 
employees to consider their decisions even when we are late from the time 
schedules.“ 
 
Among being an example and supervising that the employees follow the procedures, the 
interviewees indicated several methods to enhance safety culture and develop it in their 
organizations. 
 
“With small movements it [safety culture] gets better. It is good to enhance new 
things positively... When the boys are included in the development, it is easier to 
sell them new ideas and instructions. And that way they also participate in the 
development brainstorming. By involving people in the development.” 
 
“It is important to be active in the development programs we have here at the 
plant. When it is seen that something is not on the level where it should be, we 
have to be active in the development and push forward and that develops the 
safety culture also. When people realize that issues are addressed and we are 
trying to fix them.” 
 
The interviewees addressed the importance of including employees in the development 
processes to be one of the key elements of enhancing work practices. They also 
highlighted the need to show to the employees that development projects are important 
and issues in working practices are evaluated and developed. The importance is in being 
open and showing that the necessary developments are in process as well as explaining 
why some developments are needed. 
 
Besides the attempts to enhance safety culture, some managers indicated that safety 
culture has been developed already to the advanced level where it needs to be. Two of 
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the interviewees said that they have not thought about developing safety culture as they 
think that it is on the correct level already. These answers indicated that the managerial 
task is maintaining the level, not enhancing it further.  
 
“Well... I have not come up with any sections of safety culture where we would 
be bad at... so it is hard to say where we should develop our activities. At least 
in our function, the level of safety culture is good already.” 
 
The interviewee had earlier explained the same processes of leading by example and 
controlling the work quality. The comment shows that the middle manager’s work 
indicates efforts to be headed in maintaining the level of safety culture and reminding 
the employees of the importance of safety as well as watching over that the new 
employees adapt the work culture. 
 
Together with middle managers’ daily practices, one part of the interviews concerned 
the organizational methods to enhance safety culture and the challenges middle 
managers had faced in safety culture development in their organizations. Next, the 
methods used along with the day-to-day enhancement are introduced.  
 
An important theme that was actively discussed in many interviews was the difference 
between enhancing safety culture among the employees who already had experience of 
working in the plant and enhancing safety culture by recruiting the right people and 
training them correctly. Training was raised into the discussion also as a way to enhance 
all employees’ understanding of the phenomenon but especially it was discussed as a 
way to improve managers’ abilities to cultivate safety culture enhancement. The 
importance of safety culture training was also highlighted strongly in the new 
employees’ orientation process. 
 
The interviewees frequently called after safety culture training that helps them to 
understand what the safety culture requirements mean in their work practices. Some of 
the interviewees recognized that they have had trainings in their organizations, which 
helped them to process and recognize the importance of safety culture. Most of the 
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trainings mentioned in the interviews referred to the human performance development 
tools used in the industry. However, the mutual understanding seemed to be that the 
term safety culture was not used in the trainings that much, since it refers to such an 
abstract phenomenon. 
 
“The term safety culture is not used in trainings. We talk about technical issues, 
processes...” 
 
The middle manager level generally felt that talking about safety culture as such would 
be too vague and unhelpful for their work, if the objective would be to enhance safety 
culture by saying that safety culture should be enhanced. The interviewees did not 
mention, however, that the term would have been discussed much in their trainings.  
The interpretation is that if the training did not explicitly state that safety culture would 
be the theme of the training, the interviewees did not connect it with safety culture 
training as the question asked in the interviews were whether the interviewees had 
received some training regarding safety culture. One interviewee mentioned that 
participation in a seminar concerning safety culture had advanced the knowledge of the 
phenomenon. 
 
“I participated in a Safety culture seminar organized by STUK some five years 
ago. From there I gained some understanding about it. Otherwise, I think that I 
have just grown to understand it.” 
 
This interviewee showed understanding towards the concept of safety culture as an 
element that is recognized widely in the industry. By this interviewee sample, the safety 
culture seminar seemed to affect fundamentally the understanding of the phenomenon. 
 
Together with discussing trainings that help the middle managers to understand safety 
culture and its importance to the nuclear safety, trainings that concern middle managers’ 
ability to enhance safety culture in their work position through leadership were 
discussed in the interviews. 
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“Leadership has an effect that the employees know what they are expected to do. 
When a person knows what is expected, he or she has better acquirements to feel 
good about the job… It might be that we have not been trained for leadership 
but my personal opinion is that it is highly important in this job.” 
 
The question of leadership did not come up in all interviews, but in the ones it was 
brought up the middle managers expressed that they have not had training in leadership 
thinking and in safety culture enhancement as leaders. This is an important finding 
explaining the interviewees’ hesitation in naming their position in safety culture 
enhancement. 
 
Together with the theme of training, a challenge brought up by the interviewees was 
recruitment. The theme that was not considered before the interviews but became an 
important topic during the interviews was the recruitment process and the importance of 
finding the right people to work in the plant. The managers felt that it was 
fundamentally harder to try to change the culture afterwards when the employees have 
settled into the scene. This theme got attention from plenty of managers and they 
addressed many issues concerning new recruitments as influencers of safety culture. 
Firstly, the importance of recruiting the right people was emphasized and secondly, the 
orientation process for the new employees was brought up in many interviews. 
 
The managers brought up recruitment in several interviews while discussing the 
development of organization’s safety culture. It is essential to recruit people who value 
safety and are ready to prioritize it above other values in an industry like nuclear 
business. This task was seen as a fundamental challenge for maintaining and developing 
safety culture to the desired direction.  
 
“It is really important how we select new employees in here.” 
 
“We monitor already in the recruitment process that we get the right persons... 
We cannot take any fumblers. The process makes sure that they are careful and 
exact.” 
 
 
74 
 
 
The interviewees valued accurate recruitment processes and the ability of the processes 
to select persons who are already exact before entering the plant. Hazards in the 
recruitment process were seen problematic. They also emphasized that the development 
of safety culture relies on the persona and their ability to stay strong with their safety 
values and spreading it to develop the culture regardless of variables in other 
employees’ attitudes. 
 
“New employees learn the culture from the colleagues sitting next to them. If the 
person in the next desk respects safety, the new employee will respect it too. 
Otherwise, the new employee would not learn to respect safety. You cannot go to 
get it from somewhere... If they don’t find it from the next desk, they don’t find it 
at all.” 
 
“The practices and attitudes transfer fast to the new employee. When a new guy 
comes in, it does not take more than two months until he even walks just like the 
others.” 
 
“Safety culture is also built in the welcome-training. But it is all in the 
beginning when a new employee comes, safety culture is not the first thing in 
your mind when you just want to learn how to find the cafeteria in the building.” 
 
“One thing is to train the employees well. We have to teach them why these 
things are important. Well-trained employees understand why some aspects are 
more important than other ones.” 
 
These comments emphasize the importance of the colleagues and the team in the safety 
orientation process of a new employee. The interviewees did not mention managerial 
role in embedding desired safety attitudes in new employees’ orientation but they 
showed understanding towards the culture, which shifts the employees’ perceptions 
rapidly after entering the workplace. 
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The interviewees actively emphasized the importance of recruiting people with high 
safety standards, but some of them also recognized the challenges in these new 
recruitments and embedding them into the community and culture. 
 
“New ones easily adapt to the existing culture. Even if they had higher safety 
standards themselves, it would not take long for them to fall to the same level 
that the others have. If the person had fundamentally higher safety standards, it 
would be really hard to keep them. Maybe in the long term they could affect 
positively the safety culture, or then we should be able to recruit a group of 
these people at the same time to make a difference. Otherwise, the new ones with 
higher standards just fall to the level of others.” 
 
This is a great concern in enhancing safety culture, and it is essential to recognize the 
cultural effect described by the interviewee. Enhancing safety culture is, therefore, not 
met just by recruiting people with high safety standards and effort has to be directed on 
cultivating the culture systematically in the desired direction among the employees. 
 
The importance of the team member’s attitudes was also emphasized from the other 
direction as one person’s influence to decrease the safety culture in the work team. 
 
“The climate affects the safety attitudes mostly. If there is even one in the group 
who questions the need for safety or does not respect the instructions, it will 
slowly affect others’ attitudes, as well.” 
 
These comments indicate that it would be easier to affect the culture negatively rather 
than to develop it into a desired direction. The managers, however, highlighted that 
among the employees who have been working in the plant for a long period, it is 
extremely hard to affect their culture at all. The task is easier among new employees, 
but as they get their orientation from their colleagues, the culture shifts easily.  
 
The middle managers’ view on developing safety culture along the day-to-day activities 
centralized around training and recruitment of new employees. Together with the need 
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to train all employees, training middle managers to understand how they can enhance 
safety culture was discussed in the interviews. The middle managers highlighted the 
importance of new employees’ introduction as a way to maintain the level of safety 
culture and enhance it further. Middle managers experienced that new employees are 
more easily adjusted to enhance safety culture in the organization than the experienced 
workers are. These findings are important to acknowledge as they show how middle 
managers in practice find it possible to enhance safety culture as a managerial task. 
 
4.4. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
 
This chapter started with investigating the regulations and requirements regarding safety 
culture in the Finnish context and continued to the practitioners’ perceptions of the 
phenomenon and study of their expressions of the concept. The chapter analyzed the 
findings of the middle manager interviews and related the findings to the research 
questions by naming the subheadings according to the research questions and 
reconstructing the themes analyzed under the headings.  
 
The study shows that the safety culture regulations and requirements and licensees’ 
safety culture statements had a different approach to the safety culture enhancement. 
The interviewees hesitated on defining their role in safety culture enhancement and the 
licensees’ documentation of safety culture refers to embedding a good safety culture 
into all doing and into everyone’s responsibility in contrast to the style of the 
requirements, which refer more to the managerial approach to cultivate safety culture. 
This is an important finding to be studied more, as also the safety culture characteristics 
of IAEA (2009) highlight the importance of clear leadership in safety culture 
development. 
 
The main findings of the interviews relate to middle managers’ experiences of 
enhancing safety as a cultural manner.  They acknowledged good safety culture through 
work practices that ensure safety. Their examples showed that they do enhance invisible 
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parts of culture through leadership methods but these practices were not recognized as 
safety culture enhancement as actively as in the level of visual artifacts.  
 
The study was based on an underlying assumption that the interviewees would be 
concerned to enhance safety culture as their work task but the interviews showed that 
they systematically enhance safety in their functions without recognizing it as safety 
culture enhancement. The concept of safety culture is too abstract in nature to relate to 
and even when the interviewees showed by their examples that they do enhance safety 
culture in practice, they in general did not seem to think about it that way by 
themselves. The term safety culture is used a lot in academic literature but it was clear 
that in practice the top management level of nuclear power plants uses the term and at 
lower levels already the middle managers discuss in other terms about safety. The 
concept of safety and culture together seemed to confuse the interviewees, and they 
used other styles to talk about employees’ effects on safety.   
 
In their daily work, middle managers enhanced safety by various ways. They listed 
leading by example, reminding of the importance of the work instructions, supervising 
the work of the employees and integrating employees into development projects as 
effective practices to enhance safety. The methods include both control and 
commitment-based examples of safety enhancement. The methods listed by the 
interviewees include examples which focus explicitly on safety culture as well as on 
other aspects like behavior modification where safety culture develops as a side product, 
parallel to what Viitanen found in his study (Oedewald at al.,2015). 
 
The middle managers interviewed highlighted training and recruitment as essential 
elements of developing safety culture together with the daily enhancement. The middle 
managers felt that they had not been trained to enhance safety culture systematically in 
their teams, which explains their hesitation in stating their position in the safety culture 
enhancement. Above other things, the importance of new employees’ recruitment 
process and introduction to work were highlighted continuously as a development 
practice. The interviewees recognized that the desired safety culture is easier to cultivate 
among new employees. The views on safety culture development that the middle 
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managers had indicate that they understand the fundamental effect of the surrounding 
organizational culture on the activities of a new employee. 
 
The next tables collect the main findings of the study together to summarize the 
perspectives analyzed in this chapter. The summary consists of the safety culture 
regulations, requirements, and licensee organizations’ safety culture statements together 
with middle managers’ experiences. 
 
 
Theme Finding 
Safety culture 
regulations and 
requirements 
! A good safety culture is required by the regulation 
STUK Y/1/2016 and specified in the YVL guides 
! The decision of the implementation practices is left 
to the licensees 
! The requirements refer to managerial responsibility 
to enhance safety culture 
! Most of the middle managers were not aware of the 
content of the safety culture requirements 
Safety culture 
statements of the 
licensees 
! Licensees use the term safety culture continuously 
in the official communication 
! The importance of safety culture is highlighted 
frequently and in many occasions on the strategy 
level 
! The licensees had a different amount of 
documentation available publicly 
! The secondary data of the licensees refer to safety 
culture as something that is embedded into all doing 
 
Table 1. Summary of the findings of the secondary data  
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Theme Finding 
The concept of safety 
culture 
! The interviews indicated that the term safety culture 
was used as a target state and as a desired objective 
of actions 
! The official definitions of safety culture were not 
familiar to the interviewees in general 
! Experiences were that everyone understood the 
need for a safety culture differently in their 
organizations 
! A good safety culture was seen primarily as 
employees’ willingness to act as expected 
! The term is in use mostly on top management level 
Middle managers’ 
position in enhancing 
safety culture 
! Middle managers expressed numerous ways of 
enhancing safety in their work but hesitated in 
calling it safety culture enhancement 
! They did not experience that enhancing safety 
culture would be addressed as their task 
! Middle managers experienced that the methods to 
ensure a good safety culture were embedded into all 
practices and were everyone’s responsibility 
Methods to enhance 
safety 
! Leading by example, supervising employees’ work, 
reminding about the importance of work 
instructions and involving employees in 
development activities  
! Training to develop the managers’ awareness and 
abilities to enhance safety culture systematically 
! Recruitment and orientation of the new employees 
were seen as essential elements to develop safety 
culture 
 
Table 2. Summary of the findings of the interviews 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis examines middle managers’ experience of enhancing safety culture in 
Finnish nuclear industry. The study is constructed of scientific literature review of 
middle managers, safety & culture and qualitative empirical research of middle 
managers’ experiences as well as practitioners’ documentation about the phenomenon.  
 
Safety culture is a phenomenon which has developed in the nuclear industry, and it has 
become a mantra (Silbey, 2009) that is repeated to enhance safety in nuclear power 
plants. A good safety culture is required from the nuclear licensee organizations by 
national and international regulations but as culture is a unique phenomenon, it is up to 
the licensees to determine how they ensure fulfillment of these requirements. Middle 
managers are in central position as they work between the abstract-level requirements as 
well as organizational policies and enhance safety culture in practice.  
 
This study examines their experiences by investigating (1) how middle managers 
understand the concept of safety culture, (2) how they experience their own position in 
safety enhancement and (3) how they experience methods to enhance safety culture. 
The academic literature research shows that in organizational culture studies, middle 
managers are seen as fundamental influencers of organizational culture. As safety 
culture is understood as part of organizational culture, it affects safety in this study, 
middle managers’ role in enhancing safety culture is essential.  
 
The empirical study consists of 12 middle manager interviews, involving managers who 
work in operating Finnish nuclear plants. The interviewees were gathered from different 
functions of the organizations to form a coherent picture from different viewpoints. The 
analysis investigates official documentation of safety culture in the nuclear industry 
together with the findings of the interviews. It is essential to understand what has been 
said about the phenomenon in the requirements of the regulatory bodies as well as in the 
strategies and policies of the nuclear power companies. By examining how practitioners 
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use the term in the industry, the study forms a review of the environment where middle 
managers navigate on enhancing safety culture.  
 
The main findings of the study are reflected on academic literature in the next section to 
connect the study to previous literature. After that, managerial implications of the study 
are discussed. Finally, ideas for further research are introduced to cultivate interest in 
further studies of the phenomena. This study has found some interesting angles of the 
phenomenon of safety culture as an exploratory study, and suggestions for further 
research are expressed to complement the study from other focus areas. 
 
5.1. DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
 
The objective of this explorative study was to complement previous research by 
examining how middle managers experience and enhance safety culture. The study 
investigated the official definitions and statements of safety culture together with 
middle manager interviews to form a coherent picture of the phenomenon and the field 
where middle managers work in the Finnish nuclear industry.  
 
The literature review formed a firm base for the investigation as it helped to concentrate 
in managerial issues that might rise up in the interviews. The middle managers’ 
positions in the organizations were not in the center of the study, but the effects of the 
position and possibilities that the central position in organization offers were one of the 
key principles of the study. The analysis of the empirical study showed that the 
understanding of middle managers’ position was essential for the study and their 
perceptions differed from the official documentation of the organizations. The 
theoretical framework of the study combines managerial studies and middle 
management perspective with safety science and with safety culture studies in the 
nuclear industry.  
 
The main findings contribute to the previous research in the field of safety culture 
studies by investigating the dilemma from a managerial perspective. The discussion of 
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the main findings starts with perceptions of safety & culture, and concludes in 
discussion about middle managers. The chapter is structured in this way to show the 
reader the connections of the study to culture and the specialties of the industry and 
finally to tie it to the main purpose, to study middle management.  
 
The starting point of the understanding of organizational culture could be the difference 
between whether culture is seen as something that an organization is or something that 
an organization has (Smircich, 1998). The middle manager interviews showed both 
perspectives, while some of the interviewees indicated that culture of the organization is 
what it is and there is no point on trying to change it. These perceptions were based on a 
belief that the level of safety culture is on a good level already. Some of the 
interviewees indicated that culture is a reforming construction which restructures in 
their interactions. These views showed understanding towards the managers’ own role 
in cultural enhancement. As Reason (1998) pointed out, the approach which sees culture 
as something an organization has refers to a view where attempts to enhance culture are 
seen as realistic possibilities to reform the culture and therefore useful for the 
managerial viewpoint. The viewpoint where culture is seen as something that the 
organization is refers to the approach where middle managers found it difficult to 
discuss about culture as a separate phenomenon of the existence of the organization. 
 
The perspective to study culture can also be divided into a culture as a shared 
consensus, subcultural consensus or inconsistent in nature (Meyerson & Martin, 1987).  
In the middle manager interviews, their views of the nature of culture were seen as a 
shared consensus as they talked strictly about their organizations as one unit, but in their 
perceptions they also indicated that different teams work differently, which refers to 
subcultural consensus. The difference between these approaches was that middle 
managers viewed culture as a shared consensus when they talked about their 
organization’s respect towards safety and safety as a core value of the organizations. 
The shared consensus referred to basic values that the organizations share. The 
viewpoint of subcultural consensus, instead, referred to practices of the teams. The 
middle managers saw culture as a subcultural consensus when they talked about the 
methods and artifacts they use to maintain and develop safety culture.  
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To investigate middle managers’ perceptions of organizational culture further, a model 
by Edgar Schein is in use in this thesis to understand the abstract levels of culture. He 
structures culture through three levels to consist of artifacts, espoused values and basic 
underlying assumptions (Schein, 1985). The basic underlying assumptions and safety as 
a core value were seen as a shared consensus of the organization. From the levels of 
culture, the interviewees referred mostly to the artifacts and espoused values. These two 
are the parts of culture which are easier to identify than the basic underlying 
assumptions. Their examples of safety culture were practice-oriented and related to 
manners they rehearse in daily work. Artifacts are the only level of culture that is visual 
(Schein, 1985), and the findings of the study show that the managers understood the 
effects of artifacts on the culture actively.  
 
The managers, according to the findings of the study, also enhanced the essence of 
culture, the embedded invisible parts of the culture. The difference is that these levels 
showed in the interviews through the examples, but were not indicated directly by the 
managers. The middle managers enhanced the invisible levels of safety culture in their 
work as they had deduced themselves that it was something they needed to do. In 
general, the interviewees did not recognize that it would have been their task as safety 
culture developers, as they did not emphasize that they would embed safety culture in 
the invisible level through these practices. In other words, they saw the practices they 
reduce as attempts to increase safety, not safety culture.  
 
The finding is relevant to the ongoing discussion of the use of the term in the industry. 
As in the literature (eg. Glendon et al., 2006; Silbey, 2009) also, practitioners hesitated 
on defining the abstract phenomenon of safety culture. The middle managers related 
safety culture strongly towards safety and safety enhancement. The cultural aspects of 
the concept were harder to define. They stated, that they did enhance safety in their 
work but did not call it culture.  
 
In addition, official practitioners’ definitions of safety culture relate strongly towards 
the prioritizing of safety, too. The essence is that safety would be embedded in the 
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organizational culture and would be recognized as a core value. This has been 
highlighted in the industry by the official bodies as well as by the licensee 
organizations.  
 
The interviews showed that the middle managers were actively acting towards safe 
operations and referred to the importance of responsible behavior. The importance of 
employees’ responsible activities has been highlighted in previous safety culture studies 
(García-Herrero et al., 2013), and the interviews indicated middle managers’ active style 
to embed safety. Also Mengolini & Debarberis (2007) highlighted the importance of 
management commitment in their study of safety culture enhancement.  
 
Referring to the previous safety culture studies in the nuclear industry, the main findings 
of the study concern the reflection of the middle managers’ experiences on safety 
culture measurement studies as well as on the studies of methods to enhance safety 
culture. The DISC model (Reiman et al., 2012) introduced in the literature review 
describes different aspects of a good safety culture. The elements of good safety help to 
form a bigger picture of the middle managers’ experiences present in the power plants. 
Organizations’ understanding of safety as a genuine value were highly present in the 
interviews. The middle managers understood the meaning of safety and continuously 
argued upon the essence of safety in the industry. Moreover, the interviews showed that 
the middle managers were well aware of the characteristics affecting safety culture 
through their work practices regardless of their hesitation on calling it safety culture. 
The safety culture characteristics (IAEA, 2009) and the DISC model highlight the 
importance of management and leadership and in the following paragraphs, the 
managerial viewpoint is analyzed in more detail.  
 
The managerial aspects of the study combine managerial studies and middle managers’ 
position with managerial safety culture enhancement studies. Firstly, middle managers’ 
central positions in the strategy implementing process (e.g. Wooldridge et al., 2008) 
were clearly shown in the study where top-management level abstract objectives of 
safety culture were unfamiliar to the middle management in their practical work tasks. 
The strategic role of middle management has been under discussion in academia 
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(Rouleau & Balogun, 2011) and this study repeats the conclusion that middle managers’ 
understanding of the strategic goals would be essential in implementing the strategy. 
The findings of the interviews show that the middle managers see top-management level 
safety culture talk as abstract discourse of a phenomenon that is not manageable. They 
pursued practices to enhance safety but were not on the same level with the abstract 
safety culture talk in their perceptions about the effect of their activities. 
 
Barling and Hutchinson (2000) investigated the differences of control-based and 
commitment-based approaches to enhance occupational safety in their study. This thesis 
has clear findings that both approaches are actively in use to enhance nuclear safety. 
The middle managers used both methods to enhance safety as in the interviews several 
methods that they use in practice were discussed. It is essential to note that both of these 
approaches are in use. Control-based approaches to safety culture enhancement were 
clearly the first impression of the interviews. The importance of procedures and 
instructions are in great role in the industry. The interviews indicated that the 
commitment-based approach was experienced as a personal choice of the manager to 
pursue. 
 
Many interviewees stated that they want to include their team members in decision-
making and development because they have learned in practice that these elements 
increase the commitment, and therefore, the quality of the work. These themes have 
been studied in the academic research as being essential elements of performance (e.g. 
Stoker, 2006). The interviewees also emphasized the importance of increasing employee 
commitment to mutual goals by training and work orientation. These were seen as 
essential elements on enhancing safety culture.  
 
Moreover, middle managers’ central position and influence in the organization have 
been highlighted in literature (Burgelman, 1998; Mantere, 2008). This influential 
position and the possibilities it enables were not brought up by the interviewees 
systematically. Some of them mentioned the challenging position between top 
management and the shop-floor workers but the fundamental effect that they have 
towards the decision-making and attitudes were emphasized.  These activities and the 
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importance of leadership have been studied also in the nuclear industry. Martínez-
Córcoles et al. (2013) stated that the managements’ effect on the employees’ safety 
attitudes is fundamentally important. 
 
The strategic role of middle managers, which has been studied a lot (Rouleau & 
Balogun, 2011), was not actively recognized as an element of the position of the 
interviewees as they were focused towards ensuring safe operations at the plant. The 
contribution of middle managers that has been brought up in literature (Wooldridge et 
al., 2008) was not emphasized by the managers themselves. Hale at al. (2010) studied 
the successful interventions to highlight safety and stated that training and motivating 
managers was one of the most essential patterns to manage safety. These together with 
the perceptions that the leadership status of the interviewees was not discussed in the 
organizations widely indicate that the managers focused on their managerial role above 
the possibilities to affect the performance as leaders.  To collect the main managerial 
perspectives from these findings, the next section will focus on the managerial 
implications of the study.  
 
5.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This section is dedicated to the managerial implications of the study. This thesis has 
focused on the academic impact of the investigation but, moreover, some implications 
to practitioners can be made. In this chapter, the final thoughts of managerial 
implications are summarized. 
 
First, the term safety culture is challenging. Many researches alert that the term is 
challenging to determine and it shows strongly in the study that the term is vague to be 
used in practice. The study shows that middle managers have difficulties in defining the 
term and find it better to talk about the issues behind it than the term itself. In the 
industry, practitioners should pay attention closely to what they want to emphasize 
when the term is used. Some of the interviewees debated safety culture as a fixed goal 
of the top management. The safety culture discussion makes it difficult for the managers 
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to focus on what is actually meant by using the term and some of the interviewees 
indicated that the trend of talking about safety culture has been mixed to areas where 
something different is meant. 
 
Second, middle managers had difficulties in stating the managerial perspective to 
enhance safety culture in the licensee organizations precisely. The interviewees did not 
recall that safety culture enhancement would be their task, or that they would have been 
trained to enhance cultural aspects. As previous research indicates, middle managers 
have fundamental role in developing organizational culture, and therefore, they should 
recognize their essential position. This is essential especially in nuclear industry where 
cultural aspects have been recognized as fundamentally important safety requirements.  
 
Furthermore, together with helping the managers to recognize their position to enhance 
safety culture, the methods that the managers can utilize to enhance safety culture 
systematically in their daily activities could be included in their training program. In this 
study, the training program or methods were not investigated but the interviews indicate 
what the managers remember of the trainings that they possibly have had and shows that 
some adjustment should be looked for. Trainings were not mentioned in discussion 
about the managerial possibilities and position to systematically enhance safety culture 
on different levels of culture. 
 
Lastly, middle managers brought up recruitment process and new employees’ 
introduction to the work systematically in the interviews. They summarized that among 
experienced employees, the safety culture enhancement was mostly about maintaining 
the level that has been reached before, but among new employees, the level of safety 
culture was easier to develop. This perception might also arise from the experience that 
the middle managers felt that they had developed leadership skills mostly by themselves 
and the task to enhance safety culture among experienced employees calls for strong 
leadership mentality. Among new employees, the task to enhance safety culture might 
be easier to be adjusted. Many interviewees discussed the importance of focusing on the 
new employees and of making sure that as they start to form their own practices, they 
would form them around the desired safety level. The examples brought up in the 
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interviews formed a picture that in the moment the new employees’ introduction would 
lie mainly in the formal trainings, and otherwise the work practices are formed by 
learning from others. This phenomenon should be studied further to form a precise 
picture of the new employees’ introduction process outside the official trainings. 
 
5.3. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The focus of this thesis has been on the middle managers’ experiences of safety culture 
enhancement in the operating nuclear power plants in Finland. The study was formed 
this way to complement previous safety science studies of safety culture with a 
managerial perspective. The managerial perspective could have been studied, just as 
well, from the top management level or from the operational team leaders’ perspectives. 
Both of these perspectives would be an interesting complement to this investigation. 
 
This study investigates the use of the term among the practitioners as a part to 
understand the environment where the managers work. Nevertheless, the practitioners’ 
perceptions of safety culture could be studied with a wider range by focusing the study 
on the definition and use of the term, instead of mixing it together with the middle 
managers’ perceptions. The term is used widely both in academia and by practitioners, 
and investigating the correlation of the use of the term would be an interesting study 
alone. 
 
Furthermore, the findings of the study suggest some new ideas for further research. 
Firstly, the effectiveness of control-based approach to enhance safety culture versus 
commitment-based approach should be studied in the industry. Barling & Hutchinson 
(2000) investigated the phenomenon in the field of workplace safety, and as the middle 
manager interviews brought up that both of these methods were used in the industry to 
enhance safety culture, a study should be focused on those practices. Another theme that 
arose from the interviews is the implementation chain of the safety culture principles in 
the licensee organizations. A study should be conducted to investigate how top 
management safety culture statements are executed in the field. The middle managers of 
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this study were not familiar with the official safety culture objectives of the licensees, 
and the researcher was left with the question of how the objectives are executed and 
how the management system around safety culture objectives works in practice.  
 
Nevertheless, this study investigated middle managers’ experiences and perceptions of 
safety culture enhancement. A complement study should be conducted to investigate the 
practices of the phenomenon. It would be fascinating to complement this thesis with a 
practice-oriented view and to study how these middle managers’ perceptions are shown 
in practice. All in all, previous safety culture studies should be complemented with 
research which focuses on people and practices. Many studies can be found defining 
safety culture and advancing evaluation theories of the levels of safety culture. Further 
studies should be focused on investigating the effectiveness of safety culture practices 
as licensee organizations use plenty of resources to enhance safety culture. 
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7. APPENDIX: INTERVIEW OUTLINE 
 
 
Master’s Thesis       Interview outline 
Jenni Haavisto       April, 2016 
Aalto University School of Business 
Management & International Business 
 
 
 
Aloituskysymyksiä 
- Kertoisitko vähän taustastasi? 
- Kauanko olet ollut täällä töissä? 
- Millaisia työtehtäviä sinulla on ollut? 
 
 
1. Keskijohdon työ 
a. Kertoisitko vähän omista työtehtävistä? 
b. Mikä on sinun vetämäsi ryhmän merkitys teidän laitokselle? 
 
2. Turvallisuuskulttuurin määritelmä 
a. Onko organisaatiossa annettu jokin virallinen määritelmä 
turvallisuuskulttuurin käsitteelle? Mikä se on? 
b. Mitä turvallisuuskulttuuri ilmiönä tarkoittaa sinun oman työsi 
näkökulmasta? 
c. Mistä uskot oman käsityksesi turvallisuuskulttuurista pohjautuvan? 
 
3. Turvallisuuskulttuurin johtaminen  
a. Mikä sinun tehtäväsi käytännössä esimiehenä on 
turvallisuuskulttuurin ylläpitämisessä ja kehittämisessä?  
b. Käytännön esimerkkejä molemmista? Miksi?  
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c. Miten turvallisuuskulttuurin tulisi teillä kehittyä tulevaisuudessa / 
mihin pyrit toiminnallasi? Miksi? Mihin perustuu, mitä taustalla? 
d. Minkälaisia haasteita koet turvallisuuskulttuurin kehittämisessä? 
e. Millä keinoilla yleisesti keskijohto voi mielestäsi kehittää 
turvallisuuskulttuuria? 
 
4. Strategia ja määräykset (kytkentä laajempaan kontekstiin) 
a. Minkälaiset tekijät/tahot/toimijat/tapahtumat ovat teidän laitoksella 
eniten vaikuttaneet siihen, millaiseksi turvallisuuskulttuuri on 
muotoutunut? 
b. Millainen merkitys yhtiön strategialla on laitoksen 
turvallisuuskulttuuriin? 
c. Entä STUKin vaatimuksilla, millainen merkitys 
turvallisuuskulttuuriin laitoksilla? 
d. Miten turvallisuuskulttuuria voisi kehittää vielä paremmin sinun 
näkökulmastasi? 
 
 
Lopetuskysymyksiä 
- Käsittelivätkö kysymykseni oikeita asioita? 
- Mitä muuta haluaisit vielä kertoa? 
